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A CHAIN OF INFERENCES PROVING
DISCRIMINATION
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER*
There are three elements in a plaintiff's prima facie case of
individual disparate treatment discrimination: (1) the plain-
tiff suffered an adverse employment action, (2) the action
was linked to the defendant, and (3) the defendant's action
was motivated by a protected characteristic of the plaintiff.
The third element-the defendant's intent to discriminate-
is the most challenging to prove. Thus, most individual dis-
parate treatment discrimination cases, and this Article, fo-
cus on this inquiry. Part of the difficulty is that the second
element-the level of linkage between the plaintiff's harm
and the defendant's action-has been tied up in the discus-
sion of intent. After the Supreme Court decisions in Reeves
and Desert Palace, however, it is possible to clarify the link-
age question and identify the array of claims that can be
used to prove discriminatory intent.
Claims that can be used to prove discriminatory motivation
or intent include, but are not limited to, a straightforward
claim of unequal treatment, a defendant's admission that it
discriminated, an action based on stereotypes, and a
McDonnell Douglas approach. Where the McDonnell Doug-
las approach is used, proof may take several forms: proof
that the defendant lied in its assertion of a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its action; proof that completely
knocks out the defendant's explanation; or proof that elimi-
nates any likely nondiscriminatory reasons. In sum, after
decades of uncertainty, a general approach to proof of indi-
vidual disparate treatment cases may finally be emerging.
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago, Professor of Law Emeritus, Seton
Hall University. I want to thank my co-authors, Charlie Sullivan and Rebecca
Hanner White, for their tremendous insights over the years and particularly for
their help in conceptualizing this article. Also, I want to thank the faculties of the
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and after my presentations at faculty workshops. This paper was the basis for my
presentation at the Second Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor
& Employment Law held at the University of Denver and University of Colorado
Law Schools on September 28 and 29, 2007. Finally, I must thank Margaret L.
Moses and, for her splendid research help, Bree Beaumont, Northwestern Law
School Class of 2009.
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INTRODUCTION
"Discriminate . . . 1 recognize a distinction; differentiate:
babies can discriminate between different facial expres-
sions of emotion... 2 make an unjust or prejudicial distinc-
tion in the treatment of different categories of people or
things, esp. on the grounds of race, sex, or age .... "I
Title VII employment discrimination law still leaves a
great deal of uncertainty determining what the word "discrimi-
nate" means. Ironically, the conceptual difficulty is most ap-
parent in the most common cases: where a plaintiff claims, and
the employer denies, that the employer discriminated against
the plaintiff in making an individual employment decision.
There now appear to be three fundamental elements necessary
in every individual disparate treatment case: (1) the plaintiff
suffers an adverse employment action, (2) the employment ac-
tion is linked to the defendant, and (3) the defendant's action is
motivated by a protected characteristic of the plaintiff.
The last element-the defendant's intent to discriminate-
is the most problematic. This Article provides a thumbnail
sketch of the first two elements in order to set the stage for a
discussion of what discriminatory intent means or, at least,
how to go about proving whether or not discrimination moti-
vated a particular employment action. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 focuses on employment; section 703(a)(1)
specifically prohibits discrimination with respect to "compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. '2 This
element creates a boundary between employment, which is
subject to Title VII, and relationships and activities not involv-
ing employment, such as a customer's relationship with a busi-
ness. Thus, a straightforward statutory interpretation of this
element requires a plaintiff to show that her relationship to the
defendant involves employment and not some other type of re-
lationship.3 In recent years, however, lower courts have failed
to apply the statutory language. Instead, they favor various
i. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 488 (2001).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
3. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY
L.J. 1121, 1151 (1998) (arguing that "Congress's use of the phrase 'compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' emphasizes the employment-
related nature of the prohibited discrimination. The phrase is better read as mak-
ing clear that an employer who discriminates against an employee in a non-job-
related context would not run afoul of Title VII, rather than as sheltering em-
ployment discrimination that does not significantly disadvantage an employee.").
[Vol. 791244
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prophylactic rules, limiting the type of employment actions
that a plaintiff can challenge. 4 Some courts hold that Title VII
only protects against discrimination in "ultimate employment
decisions" such as a discharge.5 As a result, many acts that are
discriminatory do not justify a legal action challenging them
because only the most severe acts command the attention of a
court. However, at least one court has recently extended Title
VII protection to encompass any action that materially impacts
a plaintiffs job or job prospects. 6 Thus, depending on the court,
a plaintiff may or may not be able to challenge an action clearly
involving discrimination on the job. To demonstrate these op-
posing approaches, consider Dilbert cubicles where all the
women's cubicles are painted pink and the men's blue. Such
clear discrimination implicates the workplace of all the workers
and should, therefore, be an adverse employment action suffi-
cient to establish the first element of a disparate treatment
case. 7 Given the scope of the tests outlined above, not all
courts would find that type of discrimination sufficiently mate-
rial, and certainly none would find it to be an ultimate em-
ployment action. However, discharges and failures to hire do
satisfy the first element regardless of how it is articulated by
the court.8
The second element-the link between the adverse action
the plaintiff suffers and the defendant's intent to discrimi-
nate-is now somewhat unclear because Title VII includes two
separate provisions, sections 703(a) and 703(m), each appar-
ently establishing a different level for that linkage. 9 Section
703(a), included in Title VII as originally enacted and continu-
ing unchanged to this day, uses the language "because of' to
link together the actions the plaintiff challenges to the defen-
4. See, e.g., Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2005) (denial
of bonus is not an adverse employment action).
5. See, e.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir.
1997); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
6. See Minor v. Centocor, Inc., 457 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2006).
7. See Ferrill v. The Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468 (11th Cir. 1999), a sec-
tion 1981 case, in which the Eleventh Circuit struck down an employer's policy of
racially segregating telemarketers aimed at getting out the vote for an election,
with blacks calling blacks and whites calling whites with separate work areas for
each group to make their calls.
8. See Ernest F. Lidge III, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have
Erred in Requiring Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove that the Em-
ployer's Action Was Materially Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333 (1999).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
2008] 1245
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dant's discrimination.10 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the
members of the Supreme Court split as to which party had to
prove linkage and to what level it had to be proved, but the
Court was unanimous in finding that the language "because of'
meant that the but-for standard of linkage should apply in dis-
crimination cases. 11 Congress responded to Price Waterhouse
by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,12 which amended Title
VII to add new sections 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B). While not
changing the "because of' language of section 703(a), Congress
created a new, lower level of linkage for plaintiffs to establish
the defendants' liability in section 703(m): plaintiffs must prove
"that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivat-
ing factor for any employment practice, even though other fac-
tors also motivated the practice."'13 If the plaintiff carries that
burden, then the defendant has an affirmative defense avail-
able that is limited to the remedies the plaintiff receives. It is
not a defense to a defendant's liability. To take advantage of
this defense, the defendant must prove, according to section
706(g)(2)(B), that it "would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor." 14
There is now good authority for the straightforward statu-
tory construction that both the "because of' standard in section
703(a) as well as the "a motivating factor" with the same-
decision limitation of remedies in sections 703(m) and
706(g)(2)(B) continue to exist. In Fogg v. Gonzales, the em-
ployer hoped to overturn the grant of full remedies that a
plaintiff won by a jury verdict. 15 The defendants argued that
after the 1991 amendments, Title VII defendants always have
the same-decision defense to full remedies provided in section
706(g)(2)(B).16 According to the defendants, the addition of the
new provisions shifted the role of section 703(a); now it "is
merely the 'definition' of an unlawful employment practice,
10. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
II. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610
(1993), an age discrimination case, the Court defined the level of linkage required
in an individual disparate treatment case: "a disparate treatment claim cannot
succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in [the defen-
dant's decision-making] process and had a determinative influence on the out-
come."
12. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(B) (2000).
15. 492 F.3d. 447 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
16. Id. at 452.
1246 [Vol. 79
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whereas [section 7031(m) provides the standard for liability."1 7
Based on a plain meaning analysis, the court rejected the de-
fendant's argument. "On its face Title VII provides alternative
ways of establishing liability for employment practices based
upon the impermissible use of race or other proscribed crite-
ria-one in [section 703](a), which has been the law since 1964,
and another in [section 703](m), which the Congress added in
1991. ' ' i8 This is so straightforward that it seems beyond chal-
lenge. But, it remains unclear whether either alternative ap-
proach to linkage can be used in individual disparate treatment
claims without regard to the theory or claim of discrimination
that is made. In other words, both of these standards exist in
the abstract, but the question is whether there is something
about a particular discrimination claim, theory, or argument
that limits it to the use of one or the other of these two stan-
dards. 19 This question is discussed as the third element, intent
to discriminate, is developed.
The defendant's intent to discriminate is the main focus of
this Article. First, one thesis of this Article is that either the
"because of' standard of section 703(a) or the "a motivating fac-
tor" standard of section 703(m) can be used under any theory or
claim of what constitutes discrimination. Thus, the standard of
proof for linking the harm suffered by the plaintiff to the de-
fendant's discrimination is independent of the claim of dis-
crimination. Second, the longstanding assumption that all in-
dividual disparate treatment cases were either so-called Price
Waterhouse20 cases or McDonnell Douglas21 cases has never
been true, because courts recognize a broader array of claims
as support for the finding of discrimination. With the holistic
approach the Court adopted in Reeves v. Sandford Plumbing
Products, the test is whether the evidence in the record sup-
ports a finding of discrimination by a reasonable fact finder.22
This means that the question of discrimination is dependent
17. Id. at 453.
18. Id.
19. By theory, argument, or claim of what constitutes discrimination, I mean
an argument that a party can make, based on evidence in the record, that sup-
ports or undermines the ultimate inference that the defendant acted with intent
to discriminate. Since a broad array of evidence can be admitted as probative of
discrimination, a number of different arguments can be used just as long as each
one is supported with evidence in the record.
20. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
22. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000).
2008] 1247
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upon the evidence adduced and the arguments the parties
make to the trier of fact. Ultimately, these arguments must
show that, based on the evidence, it is reasonable to conclude
there was, or was not, discrimination without regard to the
particular claim that was made. Third, this Article discusses a
number of claims that have been used by plaintiffs. Of course,
no list can be comprehensive because claims are based on dif-
ferent kinds of evidence. Discrimination cases arise in an in-
credibly broad array of circumstances, and imaginative lawyers
will always come up with new and possibly compelling ways to
demonstrate that an action is the product of discrimination or
that it is not.
I. THE MANTRA OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AND PRICE
WATERHOUSE
The first Supreme Court case dealing with the substance of
individual disparate treatment law, decided in 1973, was
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.23 The case dealt with "the
order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action chal-
lenging employment discrimination. '24 The defendant refused
to rehire an African-American plaintiff it had previously laid
off.25 The Court elaborated four factual claims that established
what it called "a prima facie case of racial discrimination. '26
But the overall structure of the method of proof involved a
modification of the traditional structure of civil litigation. 27 In-
stead of creating a prima facie case which, if shown, would es-
tablish liability, the prima facie showing in a McDonnell Doug-
las case only creates a limited presumption of liability,
rebuttable where the defendant introduces evidence of a "le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its action, thereby rais-
ing a question of fact.28 The metaphor is that this prima facie
23. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
24. Id. at 800.
25. Id. at 796.
26. Id. at 802. To establish a "prima facie case of racial discrimination," a
plaintiff must show "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications."
27. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
28. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. The procedural consequences of the McDon-
nell Douglas structure were made clear in Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Establishing a prima facie case does not
1248 [Vol. 79
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showing creates a "bubble" which is "burst" when the defen-
dant introduces its rebuttal evidence. 29 In a McDonnell Doug-
las case, the defendant carries the easier burden of production
(and not a burden of persuasion) to "burst the bubble" of the
plaintiffs prima facie case. Thus, the focus of McDonnell Doug-
las cases is on the third step of the analysis, where the plaintiff
is required to carry her burden of proving that the defendant's
asserted reason for taking the adverse employment action was
a pretext for discrimination.3 0 Subsequent decisions developed
how this proof structure operates, 31 but the significance and
role of McDonnell Douglas is still subject to debate. 32
In 1989, the Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.33
There, the Court addressed the level of linkage required and
unanimously agreed that but-for causation was required to es-
tablish liability.3 4 The Court held that the language "because
of' found in section 703(a) meant that the plaintiff must show a
link between the employer's action and race or other prohibited
mean that such a showing suffices, by itself, to support a finding of discrimina-
tion. Instead, it creates a presumption which the defendant can rebut by intro-
ducing evidence sufficient to raise a question of fact as its explanation as an al-
ternative to discrimination. The plaintiff maintains the burden of proving
discrimination throughout and so, after the defendant's rebuttal, the plaintiff can
still win by proving that the defendant's asserted reason was a pretext for dis-
crimination.
29. See, e.g., Sheridan v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 74 F.3d 1439,
1449-50 (3d Cir. 1996).
30. See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A
Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 659, 665 (1998) (noting that not a single reported case involving a claim of
individual disparate treatment discrimination involved a defendant that was un-
willing or unable to assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action).
31. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 608-13 (1993) (holding
that an employer does not violate the ADEA by acting on the basis of a factor,
such as an employee's pension status or seniority, that is empirically correlated
with age); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-12 (1993) (holding
that the trier of fact's rejection of an employer's asserted reasons for its actions
does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law); Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981) (holding that where the plaintiff
proves a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the defendant bears only
the burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions).
32. See, e.g., Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment as a Theory of Dis-
crimination: The Need for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. &
CIv. LIBERTIES 1 (2005); Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109 (2007); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination
Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L. J.
1887 (2004).
33. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
34. See id. at 240-42.
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characteristic at a "but-for" level, but not a "sole cause" level.35
"But-for" generally means that reliance on race or another pro-
tected characteristic of the plaintiff was necessary for the em-
ployer to have acted as it did, even though factors other than
race may have influenced the employer's decision. The stan-
dard is met if, but for the plaintiffs race, the employer would
not have taken the action it did.36
In Price Waterhouse, a dispute within the Court arose over
who bore the burden of proof to establish the appropriate level
of linkage between the act challenged by the plaintiff and the
defendant's motivation for that act. The dissent wanted to
leave the burden to show but-for linkage entirely on the plain-
tiff.37 But the plurality held that once the plaintiff proved an
initial level of linkage, the burden of proof that sex was the
cause of the employer's action could be shifted from the plain-
tiff to the defendant. 38 Once the initial level is established, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not considered the plain-
tiffs sex.39 As Justice O'Connor discussed in her concurring
opinion, where the defendant is unable to prove it would have
made the same decision had it not considered the plaintiffs
sex, it is reasonable to conclude that sex was the but-for cause
of the defendant's action.40 However, if the defendant carries
its burden of persuasion on the same-decision defense, it is a
complete defense to liability. 41
Within the majority, however, there was a dispute as to
the showing the plaintiff needed to make to establish the initial
level of linkage and shift the burden of persuasion to the de-
fendant. The plurality thought that the burden should shift if
the plaintiff showed that race or sex was "a motivating part"42
of the action, while Justices White and O'Connor would have
required the plaintiff to show that sex or race was "a substan-
tial factor."43
35. Id. at 240-41.
36. Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense
of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO L.J. 489, 494-501 (2006).
37. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 258 (plurality opinion).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 277-79.
42. Id. at 250 (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring), 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1250 [Vol. 79
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In addition to the "a substantial factor" threshold showing
of linkage by the plaintiff, Justice O'Connor added another im-
portant additional requirement. This requirement effectively
divided individual disparate treatment cases into two separate
categories. 44 Justice O'Connor further required that the plain-
tiff utilize "direct" evidence of discrimination to make the sub-
stantial factor showing.45 Since Justice O'Connor's opinion was
the narrowest ground for the holding, her bifurcated approach
set the structure for all individual disparate treatment cases. 46
Thus, the first question to be answered in every case is
whether the plaintiff can point to evidence that can be charac-
terized as "direct" evidence of discrimination. 47 If "direct" evi-
dence is produced, the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting ap-
proach applies.48 If the evidence cannot be characterized as
sufficiently direct, then the plaintiff presumably has the bur-
den of proving a but-for level of connection between the chal-
lenged act and the defendant's intent to discriminate.49 The
approach using the but-for standard, which applies in the vast
majority of individual disparate treatment cases, is called the
"circumstantial" evidence approach, also known as a McDon-
nell Douglas or a pretext case.50
After Congress amended Title VII to include sections
703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B), lower courts adopted the "a motivat-
ing factor" language, thus establishing liability along with the
44. See Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate
Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 581 (1996).
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270-71 (O'Connnor, J., concurring). Subse-
quently, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993), Justice
O'Connor, speaking for the Court in an age discrimination case, appeared to adopt
the but-for standard in cases outside of the Price Waterhouse setting, stating
"[w]hatever the employer's decisionmaking process, a disparate treatment claim
cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in that
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome."
46. Where the Court is divided so that there is no majority opinion speaking
for the Court, it becomes necessary to patch together the holding. The approach
accepted to do that involves finding the narrowest ground upon which a majority
does agree. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining
that when the Court is divided, with no majority opinion, then the test for finding
the holding is to look to the narrowest ground on which a majority of the justices
agree). In Price Waterhouse, that would be Justice O'Connor's two modifications
of the rule announced by the plurality: The substantial factor level of linkage and
the threshold pointing to direct evidence to use the burden shifting approach.
47. Zimmer, supra note 44, at 579-83.
48. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. Id.
50. Zimmer, supra note 44, at 565-79.
2008] 1251
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same-decision defense to full remedies. 5 1  But most courts
maintained the O'Connor requirement that, to utilize the "a
motivating factor" level of showing, the plaintiff must have "di-
rect" evidence of discrimination. 52 Most cases fell short of the
required "direct" evidence justifying the use of the "a motivat-
ing factor" test. Therefore, the majority of cases continued to
be governed by the but-for standard. 53
The Supreme Court, however, recently revisited individual
disparate discrimination theory and appears to have undone
the prevailing view of individual disparate treatment cases
that had endured since Price Waterhouse was decided in 1989.
As will be developed, the Court eliminated, at least in mixed-
motive cases, the direct evidence threshold for the "a motivat-
ing factor" standard of linking the defendant's discriminatory
intent with its treatment of the plaintiff.54 The Court also
found that all types of evidence, whether characterized as di-
rect, circumstantial, or some combination of the two, are to be
considered in deciding the ultimate question of whether the de-
fendant acted with discriminatory intent. 55
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE MANTRA OF INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE
TREATMENT LAW
In two important decisions-Desert Palace and Reeves-the
Court set the stage for the eventual deconstruction of the view
that there are only two categories of individual disparate
treatment cases. While much is still unclear, what is clear is
that cases will no longer be differentiated by the use of "direct"
versus non-direct, or circumstantial, evidence. As will be de-
veloped, the ultimate question of what amounts to individual
disparate treatment discrimination can be answered through
reliance on direct, circumstantial, or, as will be described, "di-
rect-lite" evidence.
In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the plaintiff, a trailblazing
woman working in a casino warehouse, brought an equal
treatment claim based on a long series of events in the work-
5I. Id. at 589-92.
52. See, e.g., Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 694-95 (7th Cir.
2006).
53. See Zimmer, supra note 32, at 1929-32.
54. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
55. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
1252 [Vol. 79
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place that culminated in her discharge for fighting. 56 While
she was allegedly fired because she got into a fight, the male
employee who instigated the fight and injured her was only
given a brief suspension. 57 Given instructions based on section
703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B), the jury found in her favor.58 The de-
fendant appealed, claiming that the instructions were improper
because the plaintiff did not point to any direct evidence that
would allow her to get within the Price Waterhouse paradigm. 59
Most lower courts persisted in reading a direct evidence
threshold into the use of the "a motivating factor" and "same-
decision" standards established by section 703(m) and
706(g)(2)(B). 60 However, the Supreme Court unanimously de-
cided that the "direct" evidence threshold should not apply to
these new amendments.6 1 "In order to obtain an instruction
under [section 703(m)], a plaintiff need only present sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance
of evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice.' ",62 This
conclusion was based on the statutory language of the amend-
ments and their plain meaning.
[T]he starting point for our analysis is the statutory text.
And where as here, the words of the statute are unambigu-
ous, the "judicial inquiry is complete." Section [703(m)] un-
ambiguously states that a plaintiff need only "demonstrate"
that an employer used a forbidden consideration with re-
spect to "any employment practice." On its face, the statute
does not mention, much less require, that a plaintiff make a
heightened showing through direct evidence. 63
The opinion is brief, and because of that, its larger implications
for individual disparate treatment law generally await further
development. What is clear is that "direct evidence of dis-
56. 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003). The approach finally adoljted in Desert Palace was
predicted as early as 1996. See Zimmer, supra note 44, at 600-04.
57. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 95.
58. Id. at 96.
59. Id.
60. See Zimmer, supra note 32, at 1912. This prerequisite was based on Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
261-70 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) because there was no majority opinion
and her opinion was the narrowest holding.
61. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98-99.
62. Id. at 101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000)).
63. Id. at 98-99 (citations omitted).
2008] 1253
HeinOnline  -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1253 2008
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
crimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, '64 but what
is unclear is whether all individual disparate treatment cases
involve mixed-motives. Further, and very importantly,
"[c]ircumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also
be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evi-
dence." 65 Therefore, at its narrowest, Desert Palace stands for
the proposition that a plaintiff need not point to direct evidence
to utilize the "a motivating factor" standard set forth in section
703(m). Wherever the "a motivating factor" standard can be
used, direct, circumstantial, or any combination of -the two
types of evidence may be relied on to prove discrimination.
Whether the "a motivating factor" standard limits may be ap-
plied to all or just some types of cases was not decided in Desert
Palace.66
In what have long been characterized as the McDonnell
Douglas cases, the Supreme Court has held that what can be
called "direct-lite," along with (presumably) direct and circum-
stantial evidence can be used to establish liability. In Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, the Court applied the general
standards of federal civil procedure for determining judgments
as a matter of law.67 The Court looked at all of the evidence in
the record so that it might draw all reasonable inferences in fa-
vor of the nonmoving party-here the plaintiff.68 Because the
case was treated as a McDonnell Douglas case, the Court con-
sidered the evidence supporting the prima facie case (in terms
of those four factual claims discussed above as modified to ap-
ply to a discharge case) as well as evidence tending to disprove
the defendant's asserted nondiscriminatory reason. The Court
found the latter evidence probative even after the defendant
had introduced evidence supporting what it claimed was the
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiffs dis-
charge. 69 In addition to evidence which was immediately rele-
vant to the McDonnell Douglas analysis, other evidence was
presented that would enable a reasonable jury to conclude that
the defendant discriminated. 70 Significant among these were
ageist comments made over time to Reeves by Chesnut, the di-
64. Id. at 101-02.
65. Id. at 100 (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17
(1957)).
66. See Zimmer, supra note 32, at 1919.
67. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
68. Id. at 135.
69. Id. at 134-35.
70. Id. at 151.
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rector of manufacturing and the power behind the throne in the
toilet seat factory.71 Chesnut told Reeves he "was so old [he]
must have come over on the Mayflower," and commented to
him that he "was too damn old to do [his] job. '72 The lower
court refused to consider those comments, finding they had no
probative weight even as circumstantial evidence because they
did not fit within its narrow definition of "direct" evidence of
discrimination. 73 That is, the comments were not made by the
final decision-maker or in connection with the actual decision
to terminate Reeves. 74 The Court rejected the lower court's ap-
proach, explaining that "[t]he [lower] court also failed to draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of petitioner. For instance,
while acknowledging 'the potentially damning nature' of
Chesnut's age-related comments, the [lower] court discounted
them."75  Even if not characterized as direct evidence, those
ageist comments might be characterized as "direct-lite" evi-
dence because, if believed, they tend to support the conclusion
that the defendant was aware of the plaintiffs age and that
awareness negatively affected his opinion regarding the plain-
tiffs continued employment.
At its narrowest, Reeves stands for the proposition that
plaintiffs can rely on direct, direct-lite, or circumstantial evi-
dence, or a combination of the three to prove a McDonnell
Douglas case. Together, Reeves and Desert Palace demonstrate
that direct, direct-lite, or circumstantial evidence can be used
in both McDonnell Douglas cases and in section 703(m) cases of
mixed-motives. Thus, individual disparate treatment cases can
no longer be separated into two categories based solely on the
type of evidence presented. The question remaining is whether
there is some other basis for differentiating individual dispa-
rate treatment cases into the previously recognized categories:
one requiring the plaintiff to prove but-for linkage, the second
requiring the plaintiff to establish liability by showing that a
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. 197 F.3d 688, 692-94 (5th Cir.
1999). Had this evidence qualified as "direct" evidence, evidence that proved dis-
crimination without need to draw an inference, then the so-called Price Water-
house approach rather than the McDonnell Douglas approach would have applied.
74. Id. The plaintiff had also introduced additional evidence pointing to the
defendant's discrimination, including evidence that Chesnut had abused Reeves
more than he had a younger fellow supervisor, that, despite Sanderson having
made the final termination decision, Chesnut was the real power in the plant, in
part because he and Sanderson were married. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-52.
75. Id. at 152.
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protected characteristic was "a motivating factor" in the defen-
dant's action.
In sum, the mantra that all individual disparate treatment
cases can be divided into those relying on direct evidence as
against those relying on circumstantial evidence is no longer
viable. The next Part discusses whether there is some other
way to maintain the dichotomy between two categories of indi-
vidual disparate treatment cases, with the plaintiffs burden of
proving the but-for level of linkage as a characteristic of one
category and the "a motivating factor" level as a characteristic
of the other.
III. ALL INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
POTENTIALLY INVOLVE MIXED-MOTIVES
Differences in types of evidence no longer differentiate
McDonnell Douglas cases from section 703(m) cases along evi-
dentiary lines. That leaves the question whether there is some
other way to maintain the requirement that the "but-for" level
of showing the connection between race or sex and the chal-
lenged employment action be used to establish liability. A
footnote in Desert Palace appears to suggest that it was a nar-
row decision, perhaps limited to cases that can be characterized
as "mixed-motive" cases. "This case does not require us to de-
cide when, if ever, [section 703(m)] applies outside the mixed-
motive context. ' 76 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
said simply that, "Congress codified a new evidentiary rule for
mixed-motive cases arising under Title VII. ' ' 7 7 By limiting the
reach of Desert Palace to "mixed-motive" cases under section
703(m), Justice O'Connor suggests that there is some other
category to which sections 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) might not
apply. McDonnell Douglas cases have sometimes been charac-
terized as "single-motive" cases. So it might be argued that
76. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 n.1 (2003).
77. Id. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring). If emphasis is put on "mixed-
motive," then Justice O'Connor's concurrence might support a narrow view of De-
sert Palace. Alternatively, the entire concurring opinion could be taken as recog-
nition by Justice O'Connor that Congress had the power to amend federal legisla-
tion, such as Title VII, in ways that overturned judicial interpretations of the
statute. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was almost entirely an example of Congress
overturning a series of Supreme Court decisions that unduly narrowed various
civil rights statutes. See generally, Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr.,
The Reagan Court and Title V7I: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69
N.C.L. REV. 1 (1990).
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some difference continues to exist between single-motive and
mixed-motive cases, even after it is clear that the same type of
evidence can be used to prove both types of cases.
McDonnell Douglas cases are sometimes characterized as
"single-motive" cases because their analysis appears to require
asking an either/or question.78 Either an employer's proffered
explanation is true or merely a pretext for the actual motiva-
tion-unlawful discrimination. 79 The problem with calling
McDonnell Douglas a "single-motive" approach is that demon-
strating "but-for" linkage always involves mixed-motives until
the fact finder accepts the employer's explanation or finds dis-
crimination. It may continue to involve mixed-motives even if
the plaintiff carries her burden of proving but-for linkage. In
McDonnell Douglas itself, the defendant claimed that the
plaintiff had engaged in illegal protests against the company
while she claimed discrimination. 80 While it is possible that
the defendant had only one motivation for its action, it is not
the only possible scenario. Most importantly, a showing of
"but-for" linkage can result in liability without proof that only
the employer's discrimination motivated the employer's action.
In other words, liability can be made out using the "but-for"
test even if some additional reason, such as the employer's ex-
planation, played a role in its decision.81 Assuming a "but-for"
level of proof applies, all McDonnell Douglas cases of liability
may theoretically involve mixed motives and, given the im-
probability of proof of sole cause, most probably do.82 Because
cases that establish "but-for" linkage may potentially involve
mixed-motives, it is not possible to differentiate among dis-
crimination claims by finding that they involve single- or
mixed-motives.
In sum, section 703(a) of Title VII requires what has been
characterized as "but-for" linkage to establish liability while
section 703(m) requires "a motivating factor" linkage. Either
78. Zimmer, supra note 32, at 1898.
79. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 523-24 (1993), undermined
the either/or way of describing McDonnell Douglas cases. The plaintiff proved the
defendant's reasons to be untrue-eliminating one side of that binary question-
but the Court still upheld the finding that the other side was not satisfied. Id.
Instead of either defendant's reason or discrimination, the finder of fact had based
its decision of no discrimination on a conjecture of another reason, the interper-
sonal hostility of the plaintiff and his supervisor. Id. at 508.
80. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973).
81. Katz, supra note 36, at 521-22.
82. There are few, if any, perfect employees, especially when the employer has
a strong incentive to find some deficiency.
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type of linkage can be applicable to any case of individual dis-
parate treatment brought under Title VII. 83 So the "a motivat-
ing factor" standard of section 703(m) applies to an individual
disparate treatment claim, unless it is constructed in a manner
that precludes reliance on this standard and therefore requires
that the plaintiff prove but-for linkage.
IV. THERE ARE NOT JUST Two PROOF STRUCTURES OR CLAIMS
OF DISCRIMINATION
Categorizing all individual disparate treatment cases as ei-
ther involving "direct" evidence or "circumstantial" evidence
seems to assume that there are only two separate and distinct
claims or proof structures in discrimination cases: Price Water-
house (as modified by section 703(m)) claims on one hand and
McDonnell Douglas claims on the other. But the holistic ap-
proach to evidence that can be probative of discrimination,
which was adopted by the Court in Reeves, makes that catego-
rization improbable.8 4 Reeves made clear that, in reviewing the
record to decide a motion for judgment as a matter of law that
challenged a jury verdict, the court is "to draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of [Reeves, who won the verdict]. ''85 The
lower court erred in Reeves by dropping from its review all the
evidence in the record proving Reeves' McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case, his rebuttal of the defendant's asserted rea-
son, and other circumstantial evidence. All the evidence could
be construed as ultimately supporting the finding of a McDon-
nell Douglas case of pretext. Thus, for example, the ageist
statements could be viewed as within the relatively broad
range of evidence relevant to the third, pretext stage of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis. 86 But, given its character as an
83. As Professor Martin Katz makes clear, both section 703(a) and sections
703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) involve "but-for" linkage. Katz, supra note 36, at 493-94.
Section 703(a) imposes the "but-for" standard on the plaintiff to prove to establish
liability. But section 703(m) allows the plaintiff to establish liability by proving
the lesser, "a motivating factor" standard, while section 706(g)(2)(B) provides the
defendant the chance to avoid full remedies by proving that race or sex was not
the but-for cause of its action, that is, it would have made the same decision even
if it had not considered race or sex in making the decision. Id.
84. Zimmer, supra note 32, at 1898.
85. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152 (2000).
86. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 217 (1989) (to estab-
lish pretext, the plaintiff is not limited to evidence disproving the defendant's re-
buttal evidence but may introduce a broader array of evidence that would support
drawing the inference that the defendant's asserted reason is not true).
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admission by a party opponent,87 it would also be relevant to
and probative of a claim long associated with the Price Water-
house approach. 88 Under the expansive view the Court en-
dorsed in Reeves, the fact finder is entitled to mix and match
claims of discrimination with the evidence that supports each
of them.89
Cases, both before and after Reeves, support an analysis of
individual disparate treatment claims that would take a broad
approach to evaluating the evidence, without compartmentaliz-
ing it so as to restrict its usefulness to specific discrimination
claims or proof structures. 90 In Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., a re-
cent case similar to Reeves, the plaintiffs claimed they had been
denied promotions because of their race.9 1 The plaintiffs intro-
duced evidence that supported the inference that they were
more qualified than the two white workers who were pro-
moted.92 The probative value of that evidence was rejected,
however, because it did not meet the lower court's very narrow
view of comparative qualifications evidence in McDonnell
Douglas pretext cases. 93 While the plaintiffs evidence sup-
ported the inference that they were in fact more qualified than
the whites who were promoted, the court reasoned that it was
not probative of discrimination because the disparity in qualifi-
cations was not so overwhelmingly clear " 'as virtually to jump
off the page and slap you in the face.' ,94
Perhaps because the lower court's ruling in Ash was seen
by the Court as so clearly out of step with the current vision of
the Supreme Court, it was reversed by a per curiam opinion:
"The visual image of words jumping off the page to slap you
87. FED. R. EVID. 806.
88. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989). With Justice
O'Connor requiring the plaintiff to point to direct evidence in the record in order
to use the burden shifting approach, sexist statements made by the employer to
the plaintiff, like the explanation given to Ann Hopkins for why her partnership
bid was put on hold, satisfied that showing. Id.
89. Zimmer, supra note 32, at 1906-09.
90. See id.
91. 546 U.S. 454 (2006).
92. Id. at 455.
93. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App'x 529, 533-34 (11th Cir. 2005), va-
cated and remanded by 546 U.S. 454 (2006); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing &
Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577, 600-03 (2001)
(arguing that evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas often fails to convince federal judges that illegal discrimination actually
occurred).
94. Ash, 546 U.S. at 456-57 (quoting Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695,
732 (11th Cir. 2004)).
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(presumably a court) in the face is unhelpful and imprecise as
an elaboration of the standard for inferring pretext from supe-
rior qualifications." 95 Although the Court did not decide "what
standard should govern pretext claims based on superior quali-
fications," 96 evidence that the plaintiffs were more qualified
than the people whom the defendant promoted was considered
probative of the issue of pretext.97 If a fair reading of the evi-
dence supports the conclusion that the plaintiffs were more
qualified than the employees who were promoted, and if there
is no other nondiscriminatory explanation for the employer's
action, then it is reasonable for a jury to draw the inference of
discrimination.98 Following the expansive approach of Reeves,
the evidence of comparative qualification need not slap a court
in the face or jump off the page to be probative of discrimina-
tion. The evidence need only be sufficient to support drawing
the inference of discrimination.
Additionally, Ash is a reprise of Reeves in that Ash also in-
volved statements by the defendant's white plant manager that
a jury might find to be racist. Such statements are probative
because they tend to show the manager either discriminated
against the plaintiffs in making the challenged promotion deci-
sions or, at least, that he had the plaintiffs' race on his mind.
There was evidence that the manager had "referred on some
occasions to each of the petitioners as 'boy.' 99 The lower court
announced as a bright line rule that the use by an adult white
person in the Old South of the term "boy" without any racial
95. Id. at 457.
96. Id. at 458. The Court described other standards that some courts have
adopted. Id. For example, the Eleventh Circuit standard provides that "dispari-
ties in qualifications must be of such weight and significance that no reasonable
person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate se-
lected over the plaintiff for the job in question." Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d
695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004). The standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit enables
plaintiffs to establish pretext using qualifications evidence alone provided the
plaintiffs qualifications are "clearly superior" to those of the selected job appli-
cant. Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th
Cir. 2003). The D.C. Circuit took yet another approach, concluding the fact finder
may infer pretext if "a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff to be
significantly better qualified for the job." Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284,
1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
97. There may be some situations where the differences between the qualifi-
cations of the employees would be so small that no reasonable jury could use that
alone to find discrimination.
98. Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by
Comparators (Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of Law, Public Law Working Paper No.
1099595, 2008), available at http://ssrn.conabstract=1099595.
99. Ash, 546 U.S. at 456.
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modifier to describe an adult African American male was not
probative of discrimination. 100 As quoted by the Supreme
Court, the lower court rule was that, " '[w]hile the use of 'boy'
when modified by a racial classification like 'black' or 'white' is
evidence of discriminatory intent, the use of 'boy' alone is not
evidence of discrimination.' "101 Following its approach in
Reeves, the Court found the lower court's holding to be incon-
sistent with the idea that the fact finder should be able to draw
all reasonable inferences from the evidence.
Although it is true the disputed word will not always be evi-
dence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term,
standing alone, is always benign. The speaker's meaning
may depend on various factors including context, inflection,
tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage. Insofar as
the Court of Appeals held that modifiers or qualifications
are necessary in all instances to render the disputed term
probative of bias, the court's decision is erroneous. 102
Thus, Ash looks at the probative nature of evidence from a
broad perspective. As in Reeves, the arguably racist comments
could support a finding that the defendant's proffered justifica-
tion for promoting whites instead of the plaintiffs was not true
and therefore was a pretext for discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas approach. But, independent of a pretext
analysis, that same evidence could also support a finding that
the defendant's action was based on racial stereotypes and
therefore was discriminatory.
Several cases before Reeves arguably support the notion
that a broad standard of probative value, based on building
chains of inferences, can lead to the conclusion that the em-
ployer discriminated. In O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Cater-
ers Corp., the lower court held that a fifty-six year-old plaintiff
failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination because
the person who replaced the plaintiff was over age forty and
thus in the same protected group. 103 In assuming, but not de-
ciding, that the McDonnell Douglas proof structure applied to
an Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1957 (ADEA)
case, the Supreme Court rejected a rules-oriented approach in
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App'x 529, 533 (11th Cir.
2005)).
102. Id.
103. 517 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1996).
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favor of an approach based on drawing inferences that lead to
the ultimate question of discrimination:
As the very name "prima facie case" suggests, there must be
at least a logical connection between each element of the
prima facie case and the illegal discrimination for which it
establishes a "legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption."
The element of replacement by someone under 40 fails this
requirement. The discrimination prohibited by the ADEA is
discrimination "because of [an] individual's age," though the
prohibition is "limited to individuals who are at least 40
years of age." This language does not ban discrimination
against employees because they are aged 40 or over; it bans
discrimination against employees because of their age, but
limits the protected class to those who are 40 or older. The
fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to
another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so
long as he has lost out because of his age. Or to put the
point more concretely, there can be no greater inference of
age discrimination (as opposed to "40 or over" discrimina-
tion) when a 40-year-old is replaced by a 39-year-old than
when a 56-year-old is replaced by a 40-year-old.10 4
The Court went on to deal with the hypothetical situations of a
sixty-eight year-old replaced by a sixty-five year-old and a forty
year-old replaced by a thirty-nine year-old and indicated that it
would not be proper to draw an inference of discrimination in
either case. 105 An inference of age discrimination
cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with
another worker insignificantly younger. Because the ADEA
prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class
membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially
younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of
age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was re-
placed by someone outside the protected class. 106
Thus, a very small difference in age between the two workers
would not support a reasonable trier of fact to find that age ex-
plained the employer's decision. Presumably, however, as the
difference in ages between the two workers increases, so does
the reasonableness of drawing the inference that age was a fac-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 312-13.
106. Id.
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tor in the decision-making. It is for the fact finder to decide
whether or not to draw that inference.
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., a sexual
harassment case, the district court granted summary judgment
to the defendant on the ground that "Mr. Oncale, a male, has
no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-
workers." 107  In reversing, the unanimous Supreme Court
found no "categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment
claims from the coverage of Title VII.' l0 What is required in a
same-sex harassment case, as in all other discrimination cases,
is that the plaintiff prove there was " 'discrimination . . . be-
cause of ... sex' in the 'terms' or 'conditions' of employment." 10 9
Thus, the Court held that "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars
a claim of discrimination 'because of . . . sex' merely because
the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with act-
ing on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex."110  Be-
cause discrimination based on sexual preference is not sex dis-
crimination prohibited by Title VII, merely proving that the
plaintiff was harassed because of his sexual preference would
not be probative of sex discrimination.111 But that evidence
could be probative of the ultimate question of whether he was
harassed because of his sex.'1 2 The Court described, rather
elaborately, how a chain of inferences worked in opposite-sex
and same-sex cases, either leading to a finding of discrimina-
tion because of sex:
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination
easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situa-
tions, because the challenged conduct typically involves ex-
plicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable
to assume those proposals would not have been made to
someone of the same sex. The same chain of inference
would be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harass-
ment, if there were credible evidence that the harasser was
homosexual. But harassing conduct need not be motivated
by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on
the basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably find such
discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed
107. 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).
108. Id. at 79.
109. Id. at 80 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)).
110. Id. at 79.
111. Id.; see also Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir.
2006).
112. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
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in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman
as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace. A
same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer di-
rect comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser
treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.
Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow,
he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was
... "discrimina[tion] ... because of ... sex."'' 3
Though cast in terms of sexual harassment scenarios, this ex-
tended quotation traced out possible ways to build a chain of
inferences that supports a finding of discrimination. This ra-
tionale carries over to other scenarios of claimed discrimina-
tion. First, it makes clear that the plaintiff has choices of what
kind of evidence to introduce and then what kinds of argu-
ments she can make to the trier of fact based on that evidence.
The plaintiff can build a chain of inferences leading from the
evidence to the ultimate question of fact that the defendant dis-
criminated against the plaintiff.
Under classic rules of evidence law, it is wrong to draw in-
ference upon inference, thereby building a chain of inferences
leading to the ultimate question of fact to be decided. 114 How-
ever, John Henry Wigmore long ago condemned this supposed
prohibition against the pyramiding of inferences and, despite
occasional aberrations, his view continues to carry the day. 115
113. Id. at 80-81.
114. See, e.g., People v. Atley, 220 N.W.2d 465, 473-74 (Mich. 1974), overruled
by People v. Hardiman, 646 N.W.2d 158 (Mich. 2002).
115. The most recent edition of Wigmore's treatise makes the point in the fol-
lowing much-quoted language:
It was once suggested that an inference upon an inference will not be
permitted, i.e., that a fact desired to be used circumstantially must itself
be established by testimonial evidence, and this suggestion has been re-
peated by several courts and sometimes actually has been enforced.
There is no such orthodox rule; nor can there be. If there were, hardly a
single trial could be adequately prosecuted. For example, on a charge of
murder the defendant's gun is found discharged. From this we infer that
he discharged it, and from this we infer that it was his bullet that struck
and killed the deceased. Or the defendant is shown to have been sharp-
ening a knife. From this we argue that he had a design to use it upon
the deceased, and from this we argue that the fatal stab was the result of
this design. In these and innumerable daily instances we build up infer-
ence upon inference, and yet no court (until in very modern times) ever
thought of forbidding it. All departments of reasoning, all scientific
work, every day's life and every day's trials proceed upon such data.
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Wigmore had also rejected the significance of any distinction
between "direct" and "circumstantial" evidence, a distinction
that Justice O'Connor recreated in Price Waterhouse. That dis-
tinction was subsequently rejected by Congress in enacting sec-
tion 703(m). Thus, it is questionable whether a rule limiting
the chain of inferences, which can be used to lead to the ulti-
mate question of discrimination, would be supported. 116
After Reeves and Ash, it is proper for the parties to intro-
duce a wide array of evidence that supports or rejects building
a chain of inferences based on a variety of claims leading to the
ultimate question of discrimination. The following Part devel-
ops four different arguments that have been used to support
the finding that a defendant acted with discriminatory intent.
This is not a complete list, or a taxonomy, because new factual
settings will undoubtedly lead to new kinds of arguments of
what does, or does not, constitute evidence sufficient to support
a finding of a defendant's intent to discriminate.
V. THE VARIETY OF CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION
Despite the mystique that all individual disparate treat-
ment cases are either McDonnell or else section 703(m) cases,
the Supreme Court has, in fact, accepted a number of different
claims of discrimination that form the basis for a chain of in-
ferences that can lead to the ultimate finding of discrimination.
All of these claims start with evidence that, if found to be true,
support arguments that, if accepted, will support a finding that
IA JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 41 at 1106-11
(Peter Tillers rev. ed., 1983) (footnotes omitted).
116. While there is no rule preventing the drawing of chains of inferences,
there are problems with its use. For example, if finding Fact A gives rise to infer-
ence 1 or 2, the jury can draw inference 1. But that inference may be only eighty
percent likely, which can easily be the basis to support finding fact A. But if in-
ference 1 is only one step in the chain of inferences, then at the next step, the jury
can draw inference la or lb. If inference la is sixty percent likely, then that find-
ing satisfies the preponderance test. But that must be discounted by the eighty
percent likelihood established in drawing inference 1. The chain can continue un-
til the ultimate factual inference is to be drawn. By that time, the inference
needed to be drawn may no longer be supported using the preponderance of evi-
dence test because of the analytic need to compound the discount down through
the chain of inferences. In discrimination law, however, rejecting an employer's
asserted reason for an adverse employment decision as untrue seems to make it a
one step inference: it may be easy to satisfy the preponderance test as to the in-
ference that the actual reason was discrimination because the alternative infer-
ences-for example, an embarrassing but not illegal reason-are quite unlikely.
Thanks to Charlie Sullivan, my friend, colleague and co-author, for making this
point.
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the defendant discriminated. Because discrimination is fact
sensitive, and because what justifies drawing an inference of
discrimination is subject to imaginative argument, there can be
no comprehensive, closed list of claims or theories of what con-
stitutes discrimination."17 Reeves appears to support a broad
approach allowing the fact finder to look at all the evidence
and, based on a wide variety of claims, decide whether the de-
fendant discriminated.
A. Unequal Treatment Claims
Given the widely accepted notion that "discrimination" is a
violation of the norm of equal treatment, it is no surprise that
there is considerable authority for finding that instances of un-
equal treatment support drawing the inference of discrimina-
tion. This is true whether the unequal treatment is between
men and women or members of minority groups, and whether
the evidence of unequal treatment is joined with other types of
evidence to build a chain of inferences leading to a finding of
discrimination.11 8 In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transporta-
tion Co., the Supreme Court found that a claim of unequal
117. Compare Katz, supra note 32, at 182, which describes a variety of meth-
ods, in addition to his version of McDonnell Douglas that is based on causation, to
prove discrimination. Katz also suggests, however, that it is a taxonomy of all
possible claims that could be made:
There are only a limited number of ways to prove discriminatory causa-
tion-and they are all far from perfect. Causation may be proven by a
defendant's admissions (e.g., "I fired her because she is a woman").
Needless to say, such admissions are rare. Alternatively, causation may
be proven by statements by decision makers that do not amount to ad-
missions, but which nonetheless indicate a tendency toward bias (e.g., "I
do not like women" or "women do not belong at work"). As employers be-
come more litigation-seasoned, it has become increasingly rare for plain-
tiffs to discover such statements.... Another method of proving causa-
tion is through the use of statistics. But this type of proof requires a
large number of decisions by the decisionmaker in order to be useful-
which is unlikely in most workplaces .... Finally, plaintiffs can try to
prove causation by the use of comparative-but nonstatistical-evidence
(e.g., the fact that the last two nonminority employees who were accused
of theft were not fired, while the plaintiff was fired for theft).
Id.
118. As will become clear in this section, during the era of McDonnell Douglas
supremacy, many cases relying on unequal treatment were analyzed as cases
where that evidence demonstrated pretext for discrimination. And, of course, evi-
dence of unequal treatment can be powerful in that regard. But this section looks
at evidence of unequal treatment as an argument for a finding that the defendant
acted with an intent to discriminate without the need to place that evidence into
the three step McDonnell Douglas method of analysis.
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treatment, if proven, would support a finding of discrimina-
tion. 119 Two white plaintiffs claimed that they were discrimi-
nated against based on their race. 120 The plaintiffs were fired
for stealing goods from the company truck dock, while an Afri-
can-American employee, who was also involved in the theft,
was not discharged.' 2 ' The defendant argued that the plain-
tiffs' case should be dismissed because it did not conform to the
strictures established in McDonnell Douglas,122 but the Court
distinguished McDonnell Douglas and found that a simple vio-
lation of equal treatment, if proven, supports drawing an infer-
ence of discrimination: "While Santa Fe may decide that par-
ticipation in a theft of cargo may render an employee un-
qualified for employment, this criterion must be 'applied, alike
to members of all races,' and Title VII is violated if, as petition-
ers alleged, it was not. ' 123 The main thrust of the decision is
that all race discrimination in employment, including discrimi-
nation against white workers because of their race, violated
both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.124
The Court emphasized that Title VII was broader in appli-
cation than just the McDonnell Douglas approach: "The Act
prohibits all racial discrimination in employment, without ex-
ception for any group of particular employees, and while crime
or other misconduct may be a legitimate basis for discharge, it
is hardly one for racial discrimination."1 25 In a footnote, the
Court rejected the argument that, in proving unequal treat-
ment, a narrow standard applied to prove that the white and
black employees were similarly situated:
Santa Fe contends that petitioners were required to plead
with 'particularity' the degree of similarity between their
culpability in the alleged theft and the involvement of the
favored coemployee, Jackson . .. [But] precise equivalence
in culpability between employees is not the ultimate ques-
tion: as we indicated in McDonnell Douglas, an allegation
119. 427 U.S. 273, 281-85 (1976).
120. Id. at 273.
121. Id.
122. A McDonnell Douglas case could not be made out since the plaintiffs did
not contest that the employer fired them for theft, a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason. Thus, they could not prove that the announced reason was a pretext for
discrimination. Instead, they claimed discrimination because a similarly situated
African-American employee was not treated equally. Id.
123. Id. at 283.
124. See generally id.
125. Id. at 283.
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that other 'employees involved in acts against [the em-
ployer] of comparable seriousness . . . were nevertheless re-
tained . . .' is adequate to plead an inferential case that the
employer's reliance on his discharged employee's miscon-
duct as grounds for terminating him was merely a pre-
text. 126
Thus, as early as 1976, the Supreme Court found a claim of un-
equal treatment because of race, if proved, to be discrimination.
The inference of discrimination could be drawn based on the
evidence of unequal treatment established by comparing the
treatment of members of two races that were in some sense
similarly situated.
In the 1977 seminal systemic disparate treatment case, In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the
Court first described the violation of equal treatment as the es-
sence of discrimination: " 'Disparate treatment' such as is al-
leged in the present case is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."1 27 With this sentence, the Court suggests
that all a plaintiff must do to establish liability is to introduce
evidence of unequal treatment based on gender or race. The
next sentence, however, undercuts the straightforward view
that a violation of equal treatment is per se discrimination:
"Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment."128 Therefore, if the ultimate factual question is, as
this quotation suggests, the employer's discriminatory motiva-
tion, evidence of unequal treatment supports a chain of infer-
ences leading to the final step of drawing that ultimate infer-
ence of discrimination. This latter understanding appears to
be the prevailing view.
More recently, in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,129 the Su-
preme Court decided another equal treatment case. As de-
scribed above, the plaintiff was the first woman working in the
warehouse and the only woman driving forklifts and pallet
jacks. 130 The Court described her testimony of a long string of
126. Id. at 283 n.l (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 702,
804 (1973)).
127. 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
128. Id.
129. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
130. See supra notes 56-59.
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situations where she and her male co-workers were treated dif-
ferently:
[W]hen men came in late, they were often given overtime to
make up the lost time; when Costa came in late-in one
case, one minute late-she was issued a written reprimand,
known as a record of counseling. When men missed work
for medical reasons, they were given overtime to make up
the lost time; when Costa missed work for medical reasons,
she was disciplined. 131
This unequal treatment culminated in her discharge when a
male employee, believing she snitched about his unauthorized
lunch breaks, trapped Costa in an elevator, shoved her against
the wall and bruised her arm. 132 Costa was fired for this alter-
cation but her male attacker received only a five-day suspen-
sion. 133 In affirming the verdict for Costa, the Supreme Court
approved a jury instruction that focused on whether this evi-
dence was sufficient to support drawing the inference of dis-
crimination under the "a motivating factor" standard of section
703(m):
You have heard evidence that the defendant's treatment of
the plaintiff was motivated by the plaintiffs sex and also by
other lawful reasons. If you find that the plaintiffs sex was
a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of the
plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you
find that the defendant's conduct was also motivated by a
lawful reason. 134
The chain of inferences here led to the ultimate finding
that sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's discharge of
Costa. If the defendant did in fact treat Costa, a woman, dif-
ferently than it treated similarly situated men, that difference
in treatment supports drawing the inference that this differ-
ence of treatment was motivated by the employer's intent to
discriminate.
Even more recently, the Supreme Court decided Ash v. Ty-
son Foods, Inc., which ultimately is more easily understood as
an unequal treatment case, though the parties-and therefore
131. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc),
aff'd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
132. Id. at 860.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 858.
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the courts-analyzed it as a McDonnell Douglas case. 135 As de-
scribed above, the plaintiffs claimed that they had been denied
promotions because of their race and that they had evidence
supporting their claim that less qualified whites were promoted
instead. 136 That evidence was bolstered with evidence that the
person who made the promotion decisions had, on occasion,
called both of these adult African-American men a "boy."'137 If
the case had also been argued as a straightforward equal
treatment case, the question for the court in deciding the mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law would simply be whether a
reasonable jury could find that the plaintiffs were more quali-
fied than the whites who were promoted. If the motion for
judgment as a matter of law had been made at the close of the
plaintiffs' case-in-chief, the question would simply be whether,
based on the plaintiffs' evidence, a jury could reasonably find
for the plaintiffs. If the answer at that point was yes, the de-
fendant would be expected to present its case. Presumably, the
defendant would then introduce evidence to support a finding
that the plaintiffs were not as qualified as the whites, as well
as other evidence that might support a finding that the defen-
dant had not discriminated. At the close of the defendant's
case, the plaintiffs would have the traditional right to surrebut
the defendant's case with testimony undermining the defen-
dant's proof. At the close of all the evidence, the trial judge
could again respond to another motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law. Doing so would require the judge to determine
whether a jury, reviewing all the evidence in the record, would
135. 546 U.S. 454, 455-58 (2006).
136. See supra notes 91-92.
137. The Supreme Court rejected the rule of the lower court that " '[w]hile the
use of 'boy' when modified by a racial classification like 'black' or 'white' is evi-
dence of discriminatory intent, the use of 'boy' alone is not evidence of discrimina-
tion.' " Ash, 546 U.S. at 456 (quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App'x 529,
533 (11th Cir. 2005)). Following its approach in Reeves, the Court found the rule
to be inconsistent with the idea that the fact finder should be able to draw all rea-
sonable inferences from the evidence:
Although it is true the disputed word will not always be evidence of ra-
cial animus, it does not follow that the term, standing alone, is always
benign. The speaker's meaning may depend on various factors including
context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage. Inso-
far as the Court of Appeals held that modifiers or qualifications are nec-
essary in all instances to render the disputed term probative of bias, the
court's decision is erroneous.
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be reasonable in concluding that the defendant discrimi-
nated. 138
While Ash is more easily understood as an equal treatment
case, the issue of comparative qualifications is also relevant if
Ash is analyzed as a McDonnell Douglas case. First, to estab-
lish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove she is qualified
for the job. This was not at issue in Ash because there was no
question that the plaintiffs in Ash met the minimum qualifica-
tions necessary to perform the jobs that they sought and the
jobs were given to white employees instead. However, a case
based solely on the evidence supporting a McDonnell Douglas
case, without more, would not be sent to a jury because no rea-
sonable jury could find discrimination based only on that evi-
dence. This is the result of Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine,139 which teaches that a McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case does not, by itself, ultimately satisfy the plain-
tiffs burden of persuasion. Rather, it shifts the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant to assert, with evidence sufficient to
create a question of fact, a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son" for the action the plaintiff challenges as discriminatory. 140
If the defendant satisfies this minimal burden of production,
then the plaintiff, who continues to carry the ultimate burden
of persuasion on the issue of discriminatory intent, is required
to prove that the reason the defendant advanced was a pretext
for discrimination. If the defendant offered no legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its action, then the plaintiff would
win just on her prima facie case. 14 1 Reeves makes clear that
138. Similarly, after the jury has rendered a verdict, the losing party could re-
assert a motion for judgment as a matter of law. At this juncture, the judge would
determine whether, looking at the evidence supporting the party that won the
verdict, a jury was reasonable in reaching the decision it did. This is what the
Supreme Court did in reinstating the jury verdict in Reeves. See Reeves v. San-
derson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-49, 151-54 (2000).
139. 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
140. Id. at 254. The effect of the McDonnell Douglas presumption, then, is to
send the case to the jury on the issue of whether the plaintiffs prima facie case
has been proved, but only if the defendant defaults and does not introduce evi-
dence of its nondiscriminatory explanation for the act that the plaintiff chal-
lenges.
141. Id. at 256. If the defendant fails to introduce any evidence of its legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason (which has never happened in a litigated case, see
Chin & Golinksy, supra note 30, at 665), then the fact finder merely need find
that the plaintiff proved her prima facie case in order to be entitled to judgment.
It is not necessary that the jury find that the defendant acted with discriminatory
intent. If the prima facie case is conceded and the defendant fails to introduce
evidence raising a question of fact about its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,
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when the plaintiff produces evidence to support her prima facie
case, as well as evidence that the defendant's asserted reason is
not true, the case, absent unusual circumstances, then goes to
the jury to decide the question of discrimination.
Second, comparator evidence plays an important role dur-
ing the pretext phase of analysis in a McDonnell Douglas case.
This is particularly so in promotion cases, where employers
typically assert, as their legitimate nondiscriminatory reason,
that the person promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff.
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court decided that,
to prove pretext, an African-American plaintiff in a promotion
case did not have to prove she was more qualified than the
white who was promoted, which would have been the rule if the
traditional litigation rules about the scope of surrebuttal ap-
plied. 142 To prove pretext, however, it is obvious that proof
that the plaintiff was more qualified would be very powerful
evidence of pretext and would support drawing the inference
that the promotion decision was discriminatory.
As described above, although the Supreme Court in Ash v.
Tyson Foods, Inc. rejected the lower court's special rule on the
probative nature of comparator evidence, it did not say what
the appropriate rule should be. 143 Nevertheless, it seems clear
that evidence that the plaintiffs were more qualified than the
people the defendant promoted is probative of the issue of pre-
text, as well as a violation of equal treatment. After Reeves,
the evidence of comparative qualification need not "slap a court
in the face" or "jump off the page" to be probative either of pre-
text or a violation of equal treatment.144
Another variant of an equal treatment discrimination
claim occurs when the plaintiff proves that the defendant did
not follow its own rules and procedures in making the decision
that the plaintiff challenges. 145 In such cases, the plaintiffs
claim is that the defendant's failure to follow its own proce-
dures deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity he would have
had if he had been treated as others had been in the past. De-
spite the strength of the chain of inferences, Judge Posner in
the plaintiff would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 254.
142. 491 U.S. 164, 188-89 (1989).
143. 546 U.S. 454, 458 (2006).
144. But see, e.g., Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 740-41 (7th
Cir. 2006) (comparators must be significantly similar to the plaintiff to be proba-
tive of discrimination).
145. See, e.g., Walker v. Abbott Labs., 416 F.3d 641, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Walker v. Abbott Labs, a promotion case where the plaintiff
claimed that the employer did not follow its policy of posting
job openings, denied that there is any probative value to that
evidence:
This [evidence] makes it seem that Abbott complies with its
personnel rules only when it wants to. Indeed so. And
there is nothing wrong with that. Unless a rule is part of
the company's contract with its employees, the company is
free to create exceptions to it at will .... A well-managed
company will not make exceptions to its personnel rules
promiscuously because that will generate ill will among the
employees; they will feel they're being subjected to arbitrary
treatment, which nobody likes.... But neither will a well-
managed company adhere to its personnel rules with a ri-
gidity blind to circumstances that may make the rule occa-
sionally wholly inapt. "People in supervisory positions are
not doing their best for the company if they are content to
administer rules. Fairness, consistency, and demonstrated
interest in employee problems are the backbone of supervi-
sory morale building .... [N]o set of written policies should
become a straitjacket on management thinking."1 46
While an employer could offer Judge Posner's rationale as an
explanation to undermine the probative value of this evidence,
it is also clear that absent such an explanation, the failure to
follow normal rules and procedures can support building a
chain of inferences that ultimately leads to drawing the infer-
ence of discrimination.
While unequal treatment is a separate claim of discrimina-
tion, some lower courts push straightforward equal treatment
cases into a McDonnell Douglas claim of pretext. For example,
Judge Posner appeared to conflate equal treatment and pretext
approaches in Crawford v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co.147
[I]f equally bad or worse white men employed by the defen-
dant as conductors ... were retained despite deficiencies as
146. Id. (internal citations omitted). Judge Richard Posner is no doubt the
most prolific author on the federal bench and among legal academics. He brought
neo-liberal economics into the mainstream of the law with his publication of the
book, LAW AND ECONOMICS. That book is now in its seventh edition. More re-
cently, he has moved focus towards pragmatism with his book entitled LAW,
PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY as well as with his most recent book, How JUDGES
THINK. He does not shy away from stating his views and attempting to have
them influence the shape of the law and of legal decisions.
147. 461 F.3d 844, 845 (7th Cir. 2006).
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serious as hers, and the employer failed at the summary
judgment stage to offer a nondiscriminatory explanation for
the difference in treatment or it did but the plaintiff pre-
sented evidence that the explanation was a pretext (that is,
false), then she was, prima facie, a victim of discrimina-
tion. 14 8
This is one version of the view, never upheld by the Supreme
Court, that all individual disparate treatment cases are either
McDonnell Douglas or section 703(m) cases. 149
What is true is that, in an important and deep sense, all
discrimination cases involve a violation of equal treatment. At
the broadest, the question is whether the employer treated the
plaintiff unfavorably because of race, creed, sex, religion, na-
tional origin, age, disability, or other characteristic protected
against discrimination. Thus, the true issue is whether the
employer would have treated the plaintiff more favorably if she
was not within one of those protected classifications. For ex-
ample, it is discriminatory if an employer promotes a white
employee who is less qualified over a more qualified African
American employee-but only if the employer made its decision
based on the race of the candidates for promotion. It is also
discrimination if a female plaintiff can show that an employer
would have treated her more favorably if she had been a male,
even if there is no actual male comparator who was similarly
situated and who was treated more favorably. This is so even
when the showing of unequal treatment is not the ultimate
question to be determined, but instead is proof of a fact that
supports a chain of inferences leading up to that ultimate ques-
tion of the discriminatory intent of the employer.
A straightforward equal treatment case does not inher-
ently require a plaintiff to prove unequal treatment to the but-
148. Id.
149. For example, in Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hospital, 464 F.3d 691, 695 (7th
Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted), the court described its approach by main-
taining, despite Desert Palace, a binary distinction among all individual disparate
treatment cases as either proven by direct or by circumstantial evidence:
Ptasznik may establish her discrimination claims using either the direct
or indirect methods of proof, she has failed to do so under either method.
First, under the direct method, Ptasznik must put forth evidence that
her employer's decision to terminate her had a discriminatory motiva-
tion. She may do so under the direct method by providing direct evi-
dence, such as an "outright admission" of discrimination, or by present-
ing sufficient circumstantial evidence. But such circumstantial evidence
must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the termination deci-
sion.
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for level. Instead, a plaintiff may rely on the "a motivating fac-
tor" standard. After all, "a motivating factor" case, Desert Pal-
ace, Inc. v. Costa, involved a claim that the plaintiff was dis-
criminated against because she was denied equal treatment by
the defendant. 150 It is also true that nothing suggests that the
use of the but-for standard would, for some reason, be inappro-
priate in an equal treatment case. Thus, one kind of claim that
the defendant acted with intent to discriminate can be based on
evidence of unequal treatment and that can be linked to the
adverse employment action the plaintiff challenges by either
the but-for or the "a motivating factor" standard.
Beyond unequal treatment, there have been additional
claims or arguments that have been accepted in order to prove
a defendant's discriminatory intent. The next claim to be dis-
cussed is admissions against interest made by the employer's
agents.
B. Admitting Discrimination
Given that Title VII has been interpreted to make the em-
ployer's intent to discriminate the ultimate issue in disparate
treatment cases, it is no surprise that policies or statements by
employers that are tantamount to admitting discrimination
form the basis for drawing the inference of discrimination. For
example, the policy that was attacked in City of Los Angeles
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart-that women were
required to contribute more to get a monthly pension amount
equal to what men received-was unquestionably discrimina-
tion because of sex because it was an official policy expressing
the intent of the employer to treat men and women differ-
ently.151 Despite the fact that Title VII has been in effect for
over forty years, less formal but nevertheless telling admis-
sions of discrimination continue to happen and continue to be
challenged. 152 From Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Price Waterhouse until the Supreme Court's decision in Desert
Palace, the issue of the effect evidence of statements by a party
150. 539 U.S. 90, 95-96 (2003).
151. 435 U.S. 702, 704-05, 717 (1978).
152. Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case
Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J.
1, 48 (2005) (studying recent class action sex discrimination cases discloses sub-
stantial continuing "overt acts of hostility towards women with an intent to pre-
serve male workplace norms that have persisted despite our national pledges of
gender equality").
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opponent proving intent to discriminate, that is, in the lan-
guage of Justice O'Connor, "direct" evidence of discrimination,
had enormous procedural significance. The presence of "direct"
evidence was a threshold to the use of the "a motivating factor"
level of showing for the plaintiff to establish liability. 153 Al-
though that procedural effect is gone, evidence of statements
made by agents of a party opponent still has great significance
because this evidence can be the basis for the finder of fact
drawing the inference that the defendant acted with intent to
discriminate. If the employer tells a job applicant that he will
not hire her because she is a woman, that may not be direct
evidence of an intent to discriminate because the employer may
be joking or teasing. However, it is likely to be viewed by any
fact finder as significant proof supporting an inference of dis-
crimination.
The evidence in the record in Price Waterhouse supported
such an inference, even though the evidence was not quite as
explicit as saying, "[w]e did not make you partner because you
are a woman." Instead the partner who informed Hopkins that
her partnership bid was on hold told her that "walk[ing] more
femininely, talk[ing] more femininely, dress[ing] more femin-
inely, wear[ing] make-up, hav[ing] her hair styled, and
wear[ing] jewelry" would improve her chances next time. 154 A
reasonable jury could find these statements to be admissions of
discrimination because they make it clear that the committee
members who put her partnership bid on hold had Hopkins's
gender on their minds when they made their decision. This
suggests that they may have decided the issue differently if she
were more conventionally feminine or if she were male. 155
Thus, the evidence of those statements, if believed, is a finding
of fact upon which the fact finder could base further inferences,
including the ultimate inference that Price Waterhouse in-
tended to discriminate against Hopkins because of her sex.
Some statements might not amount to admissions. A per-
sistent problem has been the identification by some courts of
some testimony as "stray remarks." These remarks are called
"stray" or, as used here, "direct-lite," rather than "direct," be-
153. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 268-69 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
154. Id. at 235 (plurality opinion).
155. Underlying the claim that these statements constituted evidence of dis-
criminatory intent is the assumption that Price Waterhouse did not treat Hopkins
the same as it would have treated a male candidate for partner. Thus, there is an
argument that there was a violation of equal treatment.
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cause they are not clearly focused on the employment action
that the plaintiff challenges. Evidence of such statements, if
believed, is not an admission that the defendant discriminated.
But, that does not mean that they lack all probative value as to
the issue of discrimination. The lower court in Reeves rejected
the probative value of some ageist comments made by the di-
rector of manufacturing because the comments were not "di-
rect" evidence of discrimination that amounted to an admission
that the defendant discriminated when it discharged him.156
Nevertheless, this evidence reveals that an important employer
agent, who was integral in Reeves' firing, viewed Reeves' age
negatively. 157 If believed, this evidence could help build a
chain of inferences leading a reasonable jury to an ultimate
finding that Reeve's age motivated the defendant's decision to
discharge him. 158
The next question is whether the admissions-based claim
must be shown to be the but-for cause of the defendant's act.
Just as a violation of equal treatment would not seem to justify
156. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 693-94 (5th Cir.
1999).
157. Id. at 693.
158. The failure to understand the import of Reeves persists. Thus, the lower
court in Ash v. Tyson Foods, No. 96-RRA-3257-M, 2004 WL 5138005 (N.D. Ala.
Mar. 26, 2004), made the same mistake that the lower court in Reeves did and ap-
peared to persist in that mistake even after the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit in Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 F.
App'x. 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2006) reaffirmed its earlier decision and persisted in its
unduly restrictive view of what was probative of discrimination:
After reviewing the record, we conclude once again that the use of "boy"
by Hatley was not sufficient, either alone or with the other evidence, to
provide a basis for a jury reasonably to find that Tyson's stated reasons
for not promoting the plaintiffs was racial discrimination. The usages
were conversational and as found by the district court were non-racial in
context. But even if somehow construed as racial, we conclude that the
comments were ambiguous stray remarks not uttered in the context of
the decisions at issue and are not sufficient circumstantial evidence of
bias to provide a reasonable basis for a finding of racial discrimination in
the denial of the promotions.
While the finder of fact might well agree, as a matter of fact and the inferences
drawn based on that fact, that these statements were nonracial and unconnected
with the promotion decisions that the plaintiffs challenged, it is clear that such a
finding is not compelled as a matter of law as the only inference that could be
based on this evidence. Thus, the issue should not have been taken from the jury.
The refusal to find that such evidence is probative of discrimination and, thus,
should be decided by a jury persists in the lower courts. See, e.g., Sun v. Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 813 (7th Cir. 2007) ("stray remarks" not suffi-
ciently related to the challenged employer action do not defeat the defendant's
motion for summary judgment).
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limiting the proof of that to situations where the plaintiff can
prove a but-for connection between the adverse action to the
plaintiff and the defendant's discriminatory intent, so, too, a
claim of discrimination based on an admission of the employer
that he or she did discriminate would not justify a limitation of
the proof standard to the but-for level. Indeed, the basis of
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
a case involving admission evidence, was that the equities jus-
tified a lower than but-for standard. 159
C. Acting on Stereotypes
A variant of the claim that statements attributed to the
employer are admissions of discrimination is that the evidence
of acting on stereotypes can be the basis for a claim that the
employer acted with intent to discriminate. In Los Angeles De-
partment of Water & Power v. Manhart, the defendant's policy
of requiring women workers to contribute more salary per
month when they were working to get equal monthly pension
benefits was based on a stereotype that women live longer than
men. 160 At a general level of abstraction, that stereotype is
true-women in general live longer than men.161 But, for pur-
poses of Title VII, the question is whether acting on that gen-
eral stereotype constitutes sex discrimination against individ-
ual women who may, or may not, live longer than the average
for men or any particular man.
Price Waterhouse is another case involving reliance by the
employer on stereotypes. 16 2 The evidence included evaluations
in Hopkins's file that were reviewed by the partnership com-
mittee that showed that at least some partners reacted nega-
tively to Hopkins because she was a woman. 16 3
One partner described her as "macho"; another suggested
that she "overcompensated for being a woman"; a third ad-
vised her to take "a course at a charm school." Several part-
ners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one partner
159. 490 U.S. at 276-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160. 435 U.S. 702, 705 (1978).
161. Id. at 704.
162. 490 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1989) (plurality opinion).
163. Id. at 235.
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suggested that those partners objected to her swearing only
"because it's a lady using foul language."' 16 4
Further, an expert witness, Dr. Susan Fiske, evaluated some of
the remarks that appeared to be gender-neutral but were criti-
cal of Hopkins-she was "universally disliked" by staff or "con-
sistently annoying and irritating."1 65 Dr. Fiske testified that
these remarks exhibited stereotypical thinking about women
because these remarks were so subjective and because of Hop-
kins's unique status as the only woman in a large pool of part-
nership candidates. 166 The underlying point is that, because of
her unique position as the only woman up for partnership, the
speakers described her in ways that were negative. Men in the
pool, with the same or similar characteristics, would not have
been described in such a negative way.
There is considerable debate about unconscious bias and
what role evidence of such bias should play in discrimination
law. 167 Nevertheless, evidence of stereotypical thinking sup-
ports an ultimate inference of intent to discriminate precisely
because it is an unconscious expression of bias. Because dis-
crimination is illegal and quite generally deemed socially and
morally unacceptable, most people have strong incentives to
monitor or self-censor their statements to avoid what they
think are explicit discriminatory statements. But using stereo-
typical language can reveal the true intent of the speaker. If
the speakers quoted in the testimony in Price Waterhouse were
asked if they were discriminating against Hopkins because of
164. Id. (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 235-36.
166. Id. In another context, in the 1992 Presidential election campaign, Ross
Perot was taken to task for racial stereotyping based on his comments to the
NAACP national convention that repeatedly described his audience as "you peo-
ple." Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 575,
603 n.155 (2003). As with the testimony evaluated by the expert witness in Price
Waterhouse, the remarks of Perot did not explicitly refer to race, but, neverthe-
less, the general reaction was that he was thinking stereotypically.
167. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law's Effects on Implicit Bias
(Yale Law Sch., Public Law Working Paper No. 148, 2007), in BEHAVIORAL
ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.conmabstract=959228; Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidis-
crimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1023
(2006); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 479-80 (2007) (arguing that many of
Mitchell & Tetlock's critiques rest, not on any "scientific" ground, but on norma-
tive assumptions about what kinds of discrimination the law should seek to pre-
vent and punish).
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her sex, they would undoubtedly answer "no."168  And, for
many, that answer would probably be true at a conscious level.
They were not consciously aware that their speech reflected
gendered thinking about Hopkins. While a denial of discrimi-
natory intent may generally be viewed skeptically because self-
interest is involved, a denial that is true at the conscious level,
but clearly not true at the unconscious level, is particularly
poignant and significant. It can be the basis for a strong ar-
gument that the speaker did act on the basis of those stereo-
types and therefore discriminated. As the Court indicated in
Price Waterhouse, "an employer who acts on the basis of a belief
that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be,
has acted on the basis of gender."1 69
An old chestnut of a case, Slack v. Havens,170 gives a great
example of how stereotyping can establish discriminatory in-
tent. When a white supervisor called an African American
worker back to the department and excused the only white
worker before a major cleaning was to take place, his explana-
tion for his actions was that "[clolored folks are hired to clean
because they clean better."171 He may not have thought that
he was discriminating and may have meant this as a compli-
ment to his African-American workers. Nevertheless, it is
powerful evidence that he made his decision as to who would do
the cleaning based on race. In other words, he may not have
been conscious that his statements reflected bias, but, by being
so forthcoming with a statement as to his actual state of mind
that was biased, that statement constituted strong support for
a finding of discriminatory intent.
There appears to be no basis for differentiating the stan-
dard of proof-either but-for or "a motivating factor"-used to
prove that a defendant's action was based on a stereotype. As
with her view of admissions evidence in Price Waterhouse, Jus-
tice O'Connor justified her acceptance of the "a substantial fac-
tor" level of linkage and did not require a but-for level where
168. That is why the plurality's statement in Price Waterhouse describing what
would be a showing that the decision was motivated by gender was quite ironic:
"[11f we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were
and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the ap-
plicant or employee was a woman." 490 U.S. at 250 (footnote omitted).
169. Id.
170. 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885, 889-90 (S.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd as modi-
fied, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
171. Id. at887.
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there was evidence that the employer relied on stereotypical
thinking. 172
D. The McDonnell Douglas Method
A significant debate continues as to whether any part of
McDonnell Douglas survives the Supreme Court's decisions in
Reeves and Desert Palace. 173 That is because putting these two
decisions together allows direct, circumstantial, or both types
of evidence to be used to prove all individual disparate treat-
ment claims. But neither Reeves, which was analyzed as a
McDonnell Douglas case, nor Desert Palace, which did not even
mention McDonnell Douglas, suggests that McDonnell Douglas
does not remain a vibrant and useful way to prove discrimina-
tion. Rather than destroy the significance of McDonnell Doug-
las, the actual effect of Reeves and Desert Palace was to split
out the level of linkage needed to establish liability based on
the kinds of claims or arguments that can be made to support
drawing an inference that the defendant acted with discrimina-
tory intent. It appears that liability can be established in all
individual disparate treatment cases where the plaintiff pre-
sents proof that race, sex, or another protected characteristic
was "a motivating factor" or the but-for motivation for the chal-
172. 490 U.S. at 262-65.
173. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions
Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102-03 (2004)
(Since "pretext, and mixed-motives cases are nearly interchangeable," the moti-
vating-factor test will govern all disparate treatment cases, which "will essentially
return disparate treatment jurisprudence to 1972, before McDonnell Douglas v.
Green was decided. Courts will have general statutory language to apply-now
the motivating factor test-but only a general vision of how much evidence is sup-
posed to suffice for the plaintiff to avoid summary adjudication."); William R. Cor-
bett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 199, 212-13 (2003); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the
Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549, 1576 (2005); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-
Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate
Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le
Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas
and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case after Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 79 (2003); see also Henry L.
Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication Principles in Disparate
Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REV. 103, 135 (2005) [hereinafter Recapturing Sum-
mary Adjudication Principles] ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas prima facie case ... by
itself should usually be sufficient both to support a plaintiffs verdict and allow
the plaintiff to avoid summary adjudication."); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decision-
making and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 790-91 (2005);
Marcia L. McCormick, The Allure and Danger of Practicing Law as Taxonomy, 58
ARK. L. REV. 159, 161 (2005).
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lenged decision. 174 This section will proceed on the assumption
that McDonnell Douglas survives as a way to claim discrimina-
tion because its approach remains a powerful basis for building
a chain of inferences of discrimination. But there continue to
be a number of arguments as to what the McDonnell Douglas
method actually entails and why it can be useful in supporting
a finding of discriminatory intent.
1. Lying as Pretext
Even among those who believe that McDonnell Douglas
survives the deconstruction of the division based on "direct"
versus "circumstantial evidence," there is disagreement as to
what the McDonnell Douglas method actually involves. Profes-
sor Katz emphasizes that the McDonnell Douglas approach is
about proof of "pretext." For him, proof of pretext means that
the defendant lied when it asserted its legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the employment action that the plaintiff chal-
lenges. 175 For Katz, it is the factual determination that the de-
fendant lied that forms the basis for building a chain of
inferences leading to the conclusion that the defendant in-
tended to discriminate:
Once the factfinder concludes that the employer has lied, it
may again draw two different inferences from this fact.
First, the factfinder might conclude that the employer lied
for a benign reason, such as to protect the employee's feel-
ings. Alternatively, the factfinder might conclude that the
employer lied to cover up some less benign fact [potentially
leading to drawing the inference of discrimination]. 176
Proof that the defendant lied about the reason for his or
her action is undoubtedly powerful evidence that can form the
basis of drawing the inference of discrimination. 177 That is be-
174. Thus, the parties get to choose whether to use the "but-for" level or the "a
motivating factor" level to determine liability. If the "a motivating factor" level is
used, then the defendant has the opportunity, under section 706(g)(2)(B), to at-
tempt to prove the same-decision defense to full remedies.
175. Katz, supra note 32, at 124-30.
176. Id. at 126-27. Given the cognitive bias scholarship, the defendant may
well be lying to itself.
177. Another variant on the issue of the defendant lying about its reason is the
situation where the defendant changes its position on why it acted as it did. The
classic litigation question then is "were you lying then or are you lying now?" A
common situation in which this issue arises is when the employer, in response to
the initial notice by the EEOC of a charge being filed, articulates one reason but
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cause proof of lying about one's motivation is closely akin to
proving animus, which, although not required to prove intent to
discriminate, does prove discriminatory intent. 178 The ques-
tion, however, is whether it is necessary for the plaintiff to in-
troduce evidence that the defendant lied, or whether an infer-
ence of lying can be drawn based on proof that the defendant's
reason does not actually explain the defendant's action. Some
courts limit the scope of McDonnell Douglas to actual proof the
defendant lied. For example, in Forrester v. Rauland-Borg
Corp., Judge Posner opined that pretext could not be inferred
from evidence that the defendant's proffered reason was not
true because, "[a] pretext, is a deliberate falsehood. An honest
mistake, however dumb, is not."179 Professor Katz equivocates
as to how to prove that the defendant lied. In a footnote sup-
porting his conclusion that the defendant's lying is the key un-
derpinning of McDonnell Douglas, he suggests that the plain-
tiff need not actually prove that the defendant consciously
decided to not tell the truth, but that the inference of lying can
be based on evidence that the defendant's reason is not true.
"This conclusion [that the employer lied to cover up some less
benign motive] might be based on the fact that the employer's
reason was mistaken ... or from the fact of mistake in addition
to other facts which might suggest that the employer knew [the
reason it asserted] was wrong."180
The term "pretext" is not limited to the concept of lying. A
standard dictionary definition of pretext is "a reason given in
then, in subsequent litigation, changes tunes to another reason. In Reeves, one bit
of circumstantial evidence supporting the finding that the defendant discrimi-
nated against Reeves because of his age was that Chesnut, the director of manu-
facturing, changed his rationale for discharging Reeves once it became clear that
there was no possible basis for the reason he originally asserted: Chesnut claimed
that Reeves had wrongly recorded the time one employee had worked at a time
when Reeves was off work and in the hospital. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 145 (1999).
178. See Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent
versus Impact, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1469, 1505 (2005); David Benjamin Oppen-
heimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 915-18 (1993); Michael
Selmi, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1237
(1999).
179. 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). The basis for the de-
liberate falsehood rule is in established Seventh Circuit authority. See Kulumani
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[P]retext
means a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error."); Stewart
v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The focus of a pretext inquiry is
whether the employer's stated reason was honest, not whether it was accurate,
wise or well-considered."). That authority, however, predates Reeves.
180. Katz, supra note 32, at 126 n.68.
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justification of a course of action that is not the real reason."1 81
The Supreme Court has never defined "pretext" as limited to
proof that the employer lied. Such a requirement would nar-
rowly limit the potential use of the McDonnell Douglas claim of
discrimination, especially if, as the Seventh Circuit suggests,
evidence that the defendant's asserted reason was not true is
not by itself probative of discrimination. Indeed, emphasizing
the issue as one of lying would seem to impose an even nar-
rower version of the "pretext-plus" rule that was rejected in
Reeves.
Thus, proof that the employer consciously lied when it as-
serted its supposedly legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the action it took is tremendously powerful evidence that it
acted with discriminatory intent. But, in absence of evidence of
a conscious lie, there are additional reasons why the McDonnell
Douglas approach remains useful.
2. Pretext as a Complete Knockout
The McDonnell Douglas concept of "pretext" carries proba-
tive potential beyond proof that the employer consciously
lied.182 An alternative way of justifying the McDonnell Doug-
las approach is based on the broader notion that it involves a
process of elimination that can be used to build a chain of in-
ferences leading to the conclusion that the employer acted with
intent to discriminate. 183 Dean Steven J. Kaminshine de-
scribes why this process of elimination works as a claim of dis-
crimination. 184 The prima facie showing by the plaintiff "war-
rants turning the spotlight on the employer and asking for an
explanation for the adverse action" because the prima facie
case eliminates the most common legitimate reasons for an ac-
tion. 185
181. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1350 (2001).
182. Should McDonnell Douglas be construed so narrowly to require actual evi-
dence that the defendant lied, that only means that there is another argument
about what constitutes an argument supporting drawing the inference of dis-
criminatory intent that can be used and recognized.
183. Because he analyzes McDonnell Douglas as justified as a basis for con-
cluding that the defendant discriminated only on the fact that it lied, Professor
Katz rejects the idea that McDonnell Douglas is justified as a process of elimina-
tion leading to a finding that the defendant discriminated. Katz, supra note 32, at
126-35.
184. Kaminshine, supra note 32, at 8-11.
185. Id. at 10.
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Dean Kaminshine does not appear to view pretext as proof
that the defendant lied. For him, pretext cases are, in effect,
single motive cases because they require the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant's asserted reason actually played no moti-
vating part at all in the decision the defendant made. 186 "Pure
pretext cases are aptly described as single-motive cases be-
cause of the essence of the pretext's proof power-power that
derives from its capacity to operate within the confines of the
[McDonnell Douglas] litigation by knocking out one of the two
competing reasons placed in the record."18 7
Kaminshine's complete knockout rule might be viewed as
consistent with requiring a but-for showing if the plaintiff re-
lies on the McDonnell Douglas method. A finding that the de-
fendant's reason had been completely knocked out-that it
played no role in the defendant's decision-would leave dis-
crimination as the only reason explaining the evidence before
the court. Knocking out the defendant's reason and deciding
that discrimination was the reason the defendant acted would,
therefore, meet the but-for level. When utilizing the pretext
method, a court, and presumably a jury, would only review the
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, regarding the defen-
dant's asserted reason and whether the plaintiff proved that it
played no part in the defendant's decision. If the jury accepted
the plaintiffs proof, then a further finding of discrimination
would likely be at the but-for level because no other reason in
the record would remain viable.188 Presumably, the jury would
186. His argument that the focus in a pretext case is exclusively on rebutting
the defendant's assertion of its reason for the action, id. at 10, is not consistent
with the description of the broad type of evidence probative of pretext in McDon-
nell Douglas and in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). Fur-
ther, it is not consistent with the holding in Patterson that, to prove pretext in a
case where the employer asserted that it promoted a person more qualified than
the plaintiff, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that she was more
qualified than the man who was promoted. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 188-89.
187. Kaminshine, supra note 32, at 41.
188. A problem with this analysis is St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502 (1993). In Hicks, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determination
that the plaintiff had failed to prove discrimination because the trial judge, as fact
finder, was convinced that the reason the plaintiff was fired was neither the rea-
sons asserted by the defendant nor discrimination because it was simple personal
animosity between the plaintiff and his supervisor. Id. at 508, 514-15. The prob-
lem with the finding is that the only evidence in the record about personal ani-
mosity was a denial that it played any part in the decision. See id. at 543 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Thus, just because the plaintiff completely knocked out the defen-
dant's asserted reason, under Hicks and Reeves that would not mandate a finding
of discrimination.
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need to go no further. 189 But, if the plaintiff introduced addi-
tional evidence, direct or circumstantial, that was probative of
discrimination but that did not focus on knocking out the de-
fendant's asserted reason, that evidence would be evaluated
under the "a motivating factor" standard-potentially enabling
the defendant to limit the plaintiffs full remedies using the
same-decision defense. But the justification for limiting the
McDonnell Douglas part of this intricate way of proving dis-
crimination seems rather weak.
3. Process of Elimination
Undoubtedly, evidence that the defendant's asserted rea-
son played no role in its decision is a powerful basis for build-
ing a chain of inferences leading to the ultimate conclusion that
the defendant acted with the intent to discriminate. But, that
does not necessarily exhaust the probative potential of pretext
evidence. Thus, the question is whether a finding of partial
pretext-where discriminatory intent was involved along with
other factors-is also sufficiently probative to support a rea-
sonable jury finding discrimination. In other words, can the
process of elimination underlying McDonnell Douglas work
where there is evidence that the defendant's asserted reason
played some role in the decision, but was not the only reason?
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, limits
McDonnell Douglas cases to those in which the plaintiff can
completely knock out the defendant's asserted reason.
In Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp.,190 Judge Posner re-
jected an interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas approach to
pretext that suggested that mixed-motives might be implicated
in its application. If showing partial pretext is sufficient, then
the "a motivating factor" test established in section 703(m) as
interpreted in Desert Palace would be applicable. Posner called
this "persistent dictum to the effect that pretext can be shown
not only by proof that the employer's stated reason was not the
honest reason for his action but also by proof that the stated
reason was 'insufficient to motivate' the action." 19 1 For him, it
was "time the dictum [is] laid to rest."192 Judge Posner went on
189. Indeed, it would be hard to construct clear jury instructions to assist the
jury to get through the intricacies of this approach.
190. 453 F.3d 416, 417-18 (7th Cir. 2006).
191. Id. at 417.
192. Id.
1286 [Vol. 79
HeinOnline  -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1286 2008
CHAIN OF INFERENCES
to analyze some, but not all, of the possible inferences that
could be given to the "insufficient to motivate" language:
If the stated reason for the challenged action did not moti-
vate the action, then it was indeed pretextual. If it was in-
sufficient to motivate the action, either this means that it
didn't motivate it, or that it shouldn't have motivated it. If
the first is the intended sense, the dictum is just a murky
way of saying that the stated reason was not the real rea-
son. If the second sense is the one intended, then the dic-
tum is wrong because the question is never whether the
employer was mistaken, cruel, unethical, out of his head, or
downright irrational in taking the action for the stated rea-
son, but simply whether the stated reason was his reason:
not a good reason, but the true reason. 193
Posner also contemplated whether the "insufficient to moti-
vate" language really meant that the defendant's asserted rea-
sons "were factors that the employer considered but that did
not have enough weight in his thinking to induce him to take
the action complained of."194 For him, using the language "in-
sufficient to motivate" masks that this was simply another way
of saying that the reason, though on the mind of the employer,
was a pretext. 195 This is because that reason "wasn't what in-
duced him to take the challenged employment action, it was a
pretext."196 All of this appears to be based on an unstated
premise that there is only one reason for every employment de-
cision: either the reason the defendant asserts or discrimina-
tion as claimed by the plaintiff. In other words, Posner seems
to be saying that McDonnell Douglas cases must be single-
motive cases.
Judge Posner failed to address another possibility sug-
gested by the "insufficient to motivate" language: one reason
may be insufficient by itself to motivate a decision because it
was only one of a number of reasons that together motivated
the employer's action. In other words, the reason was real and
it played a role, but it was only a partial explanation for the ac-
tion taken by the employer. In McDonnell Douglas, McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transport, and Price Waterhouse, the defen-
dant's asserted reason was real-engaging in illegal protest ac-
193. Id. at 417-18.
194. Id. at 418.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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tivities aimed at the employer in McDonnell Douglas, stealing
company property in McDonald, and lacking interpersonal
skills in Price Waterhouse. However, even taking each asserted
reason as true, the defendant did not enunciate all of the possi-
ble motivations for its action. The given list was incomplete,
and discrimination may have been one of the unvoiced reasons
for the employment action Thus, the defendant's reason was
potentially "insufficient to motivate" the decision in the sense
that it was one of several reasons but may not have been, by it-
self, the but-for cause of the employer's decision. If discrimina-
tory intent played any role in the decision-that is, if it was "a
motivating factor," along with the reason asserted by the de-
fendant-then there were mixed-motives for the decision. Be-
cause it was a mixed-motive case, after Desert Palace, the "a
motivating factor" standard would apply so that liability would
be established. 197 Judge Posner's cramped view of the possible
arguments of what constitutes discrimination is inconsistent
with the broad approach taken in Reeves. There is nothing in
the McDonnell Douglas claim that prevents the use of the "a
motivating factor" standard.
Proving that the defendant lied when it asserted a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason is one way to prove the defen-
dant's discriminatory intent. Another is completely knocking
out the defendant's reason as an explanation even if the defen-
dant did not lie when it asserted the reason. A third way to
view McDonnell Douglas is that proving that the defendant's
asserted reason is only a partial explanation that, along with
other evidence, can support drawing the inference that the de-
fendant's intent to discriminate also played a role-that it was
"a motivating factor."
In sum, there are a number of claims of discrimination
that can be made based on a wide variety of factual showings.
Underpinning them all is the notion of equal treatment, but the
claims can be based on admissions by the defendant that it dis-
criminated, on proof that the defendant took actions based on
stereotypes, on proof that the employer lied about the reason
for its action, or on a process of elimination showing that the
likely legitimate reasons for the action cannot be reasonably
advanced. Though McDonnell Douglas might be a closer case if
it had to be limited in its application to the situation where the
defendant's reason could be completely knocked out, it is not
197. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 96-97 (2003).
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necessarily so limited. While the but-for level of showing is use-
ful, it is not necessary. Therefore, it appears that either the "a
motivating factor" or the but-for level of showing could be used
to apply any or all of these varied claims of what constitutes
discrimination. The next section will develop how the struc-
ture of individual disparate treatment law would work out in
litigation.
VI. LITIGATION USING THE CHAIN OF INFERENCES APPROACH
In actual litigation, plaintiffs try to find any and all evi-
dence that could constitute discrimination under as many dif-
ferent theories or arguments as they can imagine. Careful
questioning of the client, independent investigation, discovery,
and the use of expert testimony can provide skilled counsel
with evidence to support those claims necessary to build a
chain of inferences and ultimately lead a fact finder to draw the
inference of discrimination. In turn, defendants try to rebut
the evidence through denial, presenting their own evidence to
undermine the plaintiffs' evidence, as well as presenting other
evidence to support their arguments against drawing the ulti-
mate inference of discrimination.
While the court may get involved in discovery disputes
that ultimately turn on whether some kinds of evidence might
be probative of discrimination, the court typically first con-
fronts the scope of the litigation once discovery is complete and
the defendant moves for summary judgment. 198 Under the
generally applicable summary judgment rules, the plaintiff
must point to evidence that will be introduced to support a
prima facie case of the defendant's liability. 199 At this point,
the possible claims of discrimination and the level of showing
necessary to establish a defendant's liability become relevant.
Assuming that both the "but-for" and the "a motivating factor"
standards are part of Title VII law, plaintiffs have the choice of
198. Rule 12(b)(6) motions are hard to win in discrimination litigation under
the general notice pleading rules. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511
(2002) (notice pleading rules apply to claims of individual disparate treatment
discrimination).
199. See Redriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). See generally,
Chambers, Recapturing Summary Adjudication Principles, supra note 173; Ann
C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993).
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trying to prove their cases to either the but-for or the "a moti-
vating factor" level. Plaintiffs will presumably pick the lowest
level of connection between the defendant's act and discrimina-
tion-the "a motivating factor" level set by section 703(m)-
since satisfying the "a motivating factor" level is all that is
needed to survive the motion. More significantly, the plaintiff
must point to the evidence to be introduced and argue why that
evidence, if found to be true, would enable a reasonable jury to
find that the defendant acted with an intent to discriminate.
Since a plaintiff will try to have as many different kinds of evi-
dence that point toward discrimination as possible, there is no
need to pick one claim or theory of discrimination over an-
other.200 Instead, there may be multiple and overlapping
claims and arguments.
Unequal treatment ultimately underpins most of these
claims. For example, a plaintiff could argue that statements
constituting full admissions by the defendant-telling a
worker, "You are too old for this job" shortly before he or she is
terminated-prove that discrimination was on the mind of the
employer, even if the fact finder did not find them to be full
admissions. Even if there is no finding of a direct link between
the discrimination and the decision to terminate so as to consti-
tute an admission, the statement, if believed to have been
made, does reveal that the worker's age was on the mind of the
employer. That same testimony would support an inference of
discrimination if it revealed that the employer had acted upon
stereotypes.201
McDonnell Douglas can also be used to support drawing
the inference of discrimination. A good counterexample can be
found in Judge Posner's dicta in Forrester v. Rauland-Borg
Corp.20 2 In response to the plaintiffs claim of sex discrimina-
tion, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff had been dis-
charged because he had engaged in sex harassment of female
coworkers, 20 3 surely a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
taking an adverse action against an employee. In upholding
200. Strategically, a party may sometimes be faced with choosing between mu-
tually inconsistent claims. But, in discrimination cases, the different types of evi-
dence can support a variety of claims, all leading to the ultimate question of dis-
crimination.
201. In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993), the Court
said that confronting stereotypes that older workers were not competent drove
Congress to enact the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
202. 453 F.3d 416, 417-18 (7th Cir. 2006).
203. Id. at 417.
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the grant of summary judgment for the defendant, Judge Pos-
ner first described how broad and easily met the burden was
for the defendant to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case in a
McDonnell Douglas case.204 In accepting the reason the defen-
dant proffers, "the question is never whether the employer was
mistaken, cruel, unethical, out of his head, or downright irra-
tional in taking the action for the stated reason, but simply
whether the stated reason was his reason: not a good reason,
but the true reason."205
Later in his opinion, Judge Posner indicates that, at the
pretext stage, evidence that the defendant's proffered reason
was not true was not by itself probative of pretext because "[a]
pretext, is a deliberate falsehood.... An honest mistake, how-
ever dumb, is not. ' 20 6 Putting these two propositions together
means that, for Judge Posner, an employer is entitled to sum-
mary judgment even if evidence shows the reason the employer
claims it relied on is "downright irrational" unless the plaintiff
also introduced evidence sufficient to conclude that the em-
ployer had lied when it asserted this patently absurd reason. 20 7
In other words, for Judge Posner, the fact that the defendant's
asserted reason is downright irrational is not probative of the
reason being unbelievable. 208 That cannot be right. If all that
the employer can come forward with is a "mistaken, cruel, un-
ethical, out of his head, or downright irrational" reason for the
action it is attempting to defend, that in itself is probative of
discrimination, whether or not it is also proven that the em-
ployer believed it to be true. Even absent proof that the em-
ployer was deliberately lying, the failure of the employer to as-
sert a believable reason is probative of the question of
discrimination. It can be used to build a chain of inferences
204. Id. at 417-18.
205. Id. at 418. This is, of course, a reaffirmation and an extreme statement of
the at-will rule, which is modified by antidiscrimination legislation.
206. Id. at 419. The basis for the deliberate falsehood rule is in established
Seventh Circuit authority. Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d
681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[P]retext means a dishonest explanation, a lie rather
than an oddity or an error."). "The focus of a pretext inquiry is whether the em-
ployer's stated reason was honest, not whether it was accurate, wise or well-
considered." Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000).
207. Professor Katz, while emphasizing that pretext involves lying, might well
find the assertion of a "downright irrational" reason to support drawing the infer-
ence that the defendant lied. Katz, supra note 32, at 126-28.
208. This approach seems consistent with Judge Posner's policy predilection
that at-will employment trumps antidiscrimination law. See Walker v. Abbott
Labs., 416 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2005).
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leading to the ultimate question of the defendant's intent to
discriminate.
While at-will employment is the norm in the United
States, courts assume that employers have reasons for the em-
ployment decisions they make.20 9 As a matter of law, a "down-
right irrational" reason for the defendant's action satisfies the
employer's minimal rebuttal obligation under Burdine.210 Nev-
ertheless, asserting an irrational "reason" supports a conclu-
sion that the defendant did not have a good reason for its ac-
tion. In the absence of any believable reason in the record for
the action that the defendant has taken, the fact finder may
find pretext and use that to build a chain of inferences of dis-
crimination. Thus, unlike the result achieved by the court in
Forrester, the defendant's motion for summary judgment
should be denied when the employer can only come up with a
"downright irrational" reason for its action. An irrational rea-
son is so unlikely to be the real reason that a reasonable jury
could find it to be untrue and, therefore, could find it to be a
pretext for discrimination.
In deciding the motion for summary judgment, the trial
court judge is supposed to look at the evidence and draw all in-
ferences in favor of the nonmoving party, typically the plain-
tiff.211 In doing so, the judge should assume that the "a moti-
vating factor" level of showing applies. The judge should
determine whether a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff
on the ultimate factual question of the defendant's intent to
discriminate, based on each of the individual claims or argu-
ments of discrimination separately, or based on all of the
claims collectively. The judge should avoid slicing and dicing212
the evidence in ways that deprives it of its full potential. At
the broadest level, the motion for summary judgment should be
denied unless it would be unreasonable for a fact finder to build
a chain of inferences leading to the final inference that dis-
crimination was "a motivating factor" in the defendant's deci-
sion.
209. The Supreme Court assumes that employers make employment decisions
for a reason. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
210. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
211. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). See El v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 479 F.3d 232, 235 (3d Cir.
2007), an unusual case where party carrying the burden of proof-here the defen-
dant on the issue of the business necessity of an employment practice-moved for,
and was granted, summary judgment.
212. See generally Zimmer, supra note 93.
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The next major step occurs at the close of the plaintiffs
case-in-chief when the defendant is likely to file a motion for
judgment as a matter of law. With the plaintiffs full case now
in the record, the trial judge must again determine whether a
reasonable fact finder could find discrimination based on all
the evidence. If that motion is denied, then the defendant puts
in its case. At the close of the defendant's case, the defendant
may again move for judgment as a matter of law, with the trial
judge now able to look at whether a reasonable jury could find
for the plaintiff based on the complete record. At all of these
stages, the trial judge is to view the record in the light most fa-
vorable to the plaintiff; thus, the record should be judged using
the "a motivating factor" level of linkage between the adverse
employment action the plaintiff suffered and the defendant's
discriminatory intent.
If the defendant's motions are denied, the next question, if
it is a jury case, will focus on what instructions should be given
to the jury. The broad yet clear instruction approved by the
Court in Desert Palace seems appropriate if the "a motivating
factor" level of showing is to be used. 213 Using the "a motivat-
ing factor" level of linkage between the defendant's intent and
action opens up the possibility of the defendant being able to
limit full remedies to the plaintiff by proving the same-decision
defense. Thus, a risk-taking plaintiff might, especially if she is
convinced her cases is strong, ask for the instruction from
Hazen Paper-that the plaintiff be required to prove that dis-
crimination played a role in and was the determinative influ-
ence in the decision of the defendant. The higher level cuts off
the same-decision defense to full remedies, but, at least theo-
retically, is harder in the first instance for a plaintiff to prove.
Nothing prevents a defendant from accepting the plaintiffs bet
that she can prove discrimination to this "but-for" level. But it
is not clear whether the defendant can veto the plaintiffs
choice in order to preserve its ability to prove the same-decision
defense to full remedies. This would require the jury to also be
given the "a motivating factor" instruction.214 This is an odd
situation because it should be easier for a plaintiff to prove dis-
crimination to the "a motivating factor" level than to the "but-
for" level. Yet some plaintiffs might hesitate taking the easier
road to liability out of fear that a jury might split the baby and
213. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 96-97 (2003).
214. The strategic dimension of this situation was described in Ostrowski v.
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992).
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find for the defendant on the same-decision defense, thereby
depriving a plaintiff of compensatory and, potentially, punitive
damages.
It is, of course, possible that the but-for and the "a motivat-
ing factor" instructions could be given in the alternative. That
way, if the jury did not find that the plaintiff proved her pro-
tected characteristic played a role in, and was the determina-
tive influence on, the defendant's decision (the but-for stan-
dard), then the jury would be asked in the alternative if the
plaintiff proved her protected characteristic was a motivating
factor in the defendant's decision. If the jury says "yes" to that,
the next step is for the trial judge to decide whether the defen-
dant introduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury
to find the same-decision defense. If there was evidence that
could support a finding of the same-decision defense, the judge
would give the jury the instruction for the same-decision de-
fense to full remedies. All of this high level strategizing sug-
gests that most trial judges would prefer to use clear and sim-
ple instructions. 2 15
Assuming the judge decides to give the simple "a motivat-
ing factor" instruction, the parties are left to argue their cases
to the jury. Each side can argue what the true facts are, why
those facts support or do not support a chain of inferences lead-
ing to the ultimate question of fact regarding the defendant's
intent to discriminate, and why finding those facts to be true
does or does not support the conclusion that the plaintiff
proved that discrimination was "a motivating factor" for the de-
fendant's decision. If the jury finds discrimination was "a mo-
tivating factor," then the next question is whether the defen-
dant has carried its burden of proving the same-decision
defense, which has the effect of depriving the plaintiff of full
remedies. 2 16
215. On appeal, the question of whether a judge erred in giving an instruction
is subject to reversal only if the party claiming error shows that it was prejudicial.
See United States v. Jensen, 41 F.3d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1994).
216. Once there is a verdict, the losing party may file a motion for judgment as
a matter of law. The standards, as described by the Supreme Court in Reeves, ap-
ply. Looking at the evidence favorable to the party who won the verdict and any
evidence of the losing party that must be accepted as true but without looking at
questions of credibility, the question is whether a reasonable finder of fact could
reach the conclusion that was reached by the jury in the case. If the answer is
yes, then the verdict stands. If the answer is no, then judgment as a matter of
law should be granted to the moving party. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
1294 [Vol. 79
HeinOnline  -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1294 2008
CHAIN OF INFERENCES
CONCLUSION
Of the three elements of an individual disparate treatment
case-(1) an adverse employment action, (2) that was linked,
(3) to the defendant discriminatory intent-the defendant's in-
tent to discriminate is the most difficult to prove. Part of the
difficulty is that the question of the level of linkage-either the
but-for or the "a motivating factor" level-has been bound up in
the question of proof of intent. After Reeves and Desert Palace,
however, it is possible to clarify both the level of showing and
the array of claims that can prove discrimination. The level of
showing can be the but-for level based on the "because of' lan-
guage of section 703(a) or the "a motivating factor" level found
in section 703(m), and either level of showing can be used to
analyze any claim of discrimination. Direct, direct-lite, circum-
stantial evidence, or any combination of the three, can be used
to prove discrimination under any claim that a reasonable jury
would find to support a chain of inferences leading to the ulti-
mate question of discriminatory intent.
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